🚀 go-pugleaf

On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote:

>Is consciousness produced only by brain or it could be produced by a machine
>too?
>

An excellent question that has been around for a very long time.

Given that we really don't know what consciousness is or what produces
it, the question of whether a purely computational device could be
conscious is an open question.  I presume you do not mean simply a
mechanical gadget -- computation and information processing does seem
to be intimitately involved.

One general philosophical argument is that all biological processes
are simply the working out of the laws of physics and chemistry.  That
is, the brain IS a kind of machine already, so yes, consciousness can
be produced by a machine.  And that means that is could also be
produced by a non-biological machine.

in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci@4ax.com, r norman at
rsn_@_comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:

> On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote:
> 
>> Is consciousness produced only by brain or it could be produced by a machine
>> too?
>> 
> 
> An excellent question that has been around for a very long time.
> 
> Given that we really don't know what consciousness is or what produces
> it, the question of whether a purely computational device could be
> conscious is an open question.  I presume you do not mean simply a
> mechanical gadget -- computation and information processing does seem
> to be intimitately involved.
> 
> One general philosophical argument is that all biological processes
> are simply the working out of the laws of physics and chemistry.  That
> is, the brain IS a kind of machine already, so yes, consciousness can
> be produced by a machine.  And that means that is could also be
> produced by a non-biological machine.
> 
The last sentence does not necessarily follow - it is a logical possibility
that whatever it is that makes a machine "non-biological" also makes it
incapable of consciousness.  I am not advocating that position, just
pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.

"Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:BBD69100.12C8%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
| in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci@4ax.com, r norman at
| rsn_@_comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:
|
| > On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote:
| >
| >> [...]
| > That is, the brain IS a kind of machine
| > already, so yes, consciousness can
| > be produced by a machine.  And that
| > means that is could also be produced
| > by a non-biological machine.
| >
| The last sentence does not necessarily
| follow - it is a logical possibility that
| whatever it is that makes a machine
| "non-biological" also makes it
| incapable of consciousness.  I am not
| advocating that position, just
| pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.

One has to take the last two sentences of
R. Norman's post as a unit. The 2nd-to-last
sentence implies "biological machine".

ken

in article 0Fdsb.49581$Ec1.3303474@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net, KP_PC
at k.p.collins@worldnet.att.net wrote on 11/11/03 2:46 PM:

> "Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
> news:BBD69100.12C8%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
> | in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci@4ax.com, r norman at
> | rsn_@_comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:
> |
> | > On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote:
> | >
> | >> [...]
> | > That is, the brain IS a kind of machine
> | > already, so yes, consciousness can
> | > be produced by a machine.  And that
> | > means that is could also be produced
> | > by a non-biological machine.
> | >
> | The last sentence does not necessarily
> | follow - it is a logical possibility that
> | whatever it is that makes a machine
> | "non-biological" also makes it
> | incapable of consciousness.  I am not
> | advocating that position, just
> | pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.
> 
> One has to take the last two sentences of
> R. Norman's post as a unit. The 2nd-to-last
> sentence implies "biological machine".
> 
> ken
> 
> 

Right. And the last sentence concludes that because there are "biological
machines" capable of consciousness there must be "non-biological machines"
also capable of consciousness.  This does not follow.  One way to see that
is to draw a Venn diagram.

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 01:01:14 GMT, Michael Olea <oleaj@sbcglobal.net>
wrote:

>in article 0Fdsb.49581$Ec1.3303474@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net, KP_PC
>at k.p.collins@worldnet.att.net wrote on 11/11/03 2:46 PM:
>
>> "Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
>> news:BBD69100.12C8%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
>> | in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci@4ax.com, r norman at
>> | rsn_@_comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:
>> |
>> | > On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote:
>> | >
>> | >> [...]
>> | > That is, the brain IS a kind of machine
>> | > already, so yes, consciousness can
>> | > be produced by a machine.  And that
>> | > means that is could also be produced
>> | > by a non-biological machine.
>> | >
>> | The last sentence does not necessarily
>> | follow - it is a logical possibility that
>> | whatever it is that makes a machine
>> | "non-biological" also makes it
>> | incapable of consciousness.  I am not
>> | advocating that position, just
>> | pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.
>> 
>> One has to take the last two sentences of
>> R. Norman's post as a unit. The 2nd-to-last
>> sentence implies "biological machine".
>> 
>> ken
>> 
>> 
>
>Right. And the last sentence concludes that because there are "biological
>machines" capable of consciousness there must be "non-biological machines"
>also capable of consciousness.  This does not follow.  One way to see that
>is to draw a Venn diagram.

It does not follow directly.

However, if it is true that consciousness is nothing more than the
working out of laws of physics and chemistry given a particular albeit
highly complex arrangement of molecules, organelles, and cells, then
once we understand the mechanisms it should be conceptually possible
to produce an artificial device that uses the same laws of physics and
chemistry with a rather different arrangement of non-biological
components to acheive the same effect.

In article <8e53rvs4p64t9ba1njjfb2e3n7ufpnk6e2@4ax.com>,
 r norman <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote:

> However, if it is true that consciousness is nothing more than the
> working out of laws of physics and chemistry given a particular albeit
> highly complex arrangement of molecules, organelles, and cells, then
> once we understand the mechanisms it should be conceptually possible
> to produce an artificial device that uses the same laws of physics and
> chemistry with a rather different arrangement of non-biological
> components to acheive the same effect.

So, to exaggerate that line of reasoning, it should be possible to build 
a hydrogen atom out of other non-elementary components and have it 
behave the same way?  Or make a working atomic bomb out of Meccano?

I know these extrapolations are ridiculous but I make them to point out  
that the assertion that a process is created by the physical properties 
of its consituents does not imply that it could also be created by 
different materials.  Right or wrong, I simply do not believe that 
consciousness is seperable from the biological nature of the brain. 

Most AI and connectionist approaches seem to me to be like piling up 
large heaps of components and hoping that they will become a 747 
somehow.  Actually, more like piling up large heaps of sandwiches and 
hoping they will become a 747 somehow.

      Yours provokingly,

         Matthew.

"Matthew Kirkcaldie"
<Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au> wrote in
message
news:Matthew.Kirkcaldie-D642A3.16314812112003@seagoon.newcastle.edu.au...
> In article <8e53rvs4p64t9ba1njjfb2e3n7ufpnk6e2@4ax.com>,
>  r norman <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote:
>
> > However, if it is true that consciousness is nothing
more than the
> > working out of laws of physics and chemistry given a
particular albeit
> > highly complex arrangement of molecules, organelles, and
cells, then
> > once we understand the mechanisms it should be
conceptually possible
> > to produce an artificial device that uses the same laws
of physics and
> > chemistry with a rather different arrangement of
non-biological
> > components to acheive the same effect.
>
> So, to exaggerate that line of reasoning, it should be
possible to build
> a hydrogen atom out of other non-elementary components and
have it
> behave the same way?  Or make a working atomic bomb out of
Meccano?
>
> I know these extrapolations are ridiculous but I make them
to point out
> that the assertion that a process is created by the
physical properties
> of its consituents does not imply that it could also be
created by
> different materials.  Right or wrong, I simply do not
believe that
> consciousness is seperable from the biological nature of
the brain.

I'd go even further and say, consciousness (whatever it is)
is also inseparable from the (unique) body it "inhabits."
There are substantial contributions from the nervous system,
and the functional condition of the sensory organs--and of
course, the moment-to-moment chemical composition of the
brain (i.e., neurotransmitters and other biochemical
mediators which affect, for example, emotions.) Again, IMO.
...tonyC


> Most AI and connectionist approaches seem to me to be like
piling up
> large heaps of components and hoping that they will become
a 747
> somehow.  Actually, more like piling up large heaps of
sandwiches and
> hoping they will become a 747 somehow.
>
>       Yours provokingly,
>
>          Matthew.

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 16:31:48 +1100, Matthew Kirkcaldie
<Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au> wrote:

>In article <8e53rvs4p64t9ba1njjfb2e3n7ufpnk6e2@4ax.com>,
> r norman <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> However, if it is true that consciousness is nothing more than the
>> working out of laws of physics and chemistry given a particular albeit
>> highly complex arrangement of molecules, organelles, and cells, then
>> once we understand the mechanisms it should be conceptually possible
>> to produce an artificial device that uses the same laws of physics and
>> chemistry with a rather different arrangement of non-biological
>> components to acheive the same effect.
>
>So, to exaggerate that line of reasoning, it should be possible to build 
>a hydrogen atom out of other non-elementary components and have it 
>behave the same way?  Or make a working atomic bomb out of Meccano?
>
>I know these extrapolations are ridiculous but I make them to point out  
>that the assertion that a process is created by the physical properties 
>of its consituents does not imply that it could also be created by 
>different materials.  Right or wrong, I simply do not believe that 
>consciousness is seperable from the biological nature of the brain. 
>
>Most AI and connectionist approaches seem to me to be like piling up 
>large heaps of components and hoping that they will become a 747 
>somehow.  Actually, more like piling up large heaps of sandwiches and 
>hoping they will become a 747 somehow.
>

We are not really disagreeing, just having a lot of fun with
disputations!

You hit the nail on the head by your "assertion that a process is
created by the physical properties oits consitutents does not
imply..."  I originally included some form of computation or
information processing as an essential part of consciousness.  In my
way of thinking, "computation" like "negative feedback regulation" or
"controlled release of energy" is a  "process" separate from its
physical implementation.  Processing a broadcast electromagnetic wave
to produce a television picture with sound is the "same" whether the
machinery is vacuum tube or very large scale integrated circuitry. I
argue that "consciousness" is likely to be the same type of thing.  In
computerese, it could be ported to a different platform.

The failures of AI to date merely indicate the enormity of what we
don't know.  At some point we are likely to figure it out.  I can't
imagine that point coming even in the next few decades, though, if
even in the next century!

Where we strongly disagree is you believe that consciousness is
inseparable from the biological nature of the brain.  If consciousness
lies in the physical implementation, then there must be something
special about the structure of neurons.  But there isn't anything
there that is not found (in one form or another) in virtually all
cells!  Do all living cells have some form of nascent consciousness?
Then consciousness is an integral part of what we think of as "life".
I disagree.  It must be in the pattern of arrangement and interaction
of the nerve cells.  And patterns of interaction can be replicated in
different hardware.

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 07:56:05 GMT, "Anthony Cerrato"
<tcerrato@optonline.net> in sci.cognitive wrote:

>
>"Matthew Kirkcaldie"
><Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au> wrote in
>message
>news:Matthew.Kirkcaldie-D642A3.16314812112003@seagoon.newcastle.edu.au...
>> In article <8e53rvs4p64t9ba1njjfb2e3n7ufpnk6e2@4ax.com>,
>>  r norman <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote:
>>
[. . .]

>> I know these extrapolations are ridiculous but I make them
>to point out
>> that the assertion that a process is created by the
>physical properties
>> of its consituents does not imply that it could also be
>created by
>> different materials.  Right or wrong, I simply do not
>believe that
>> consciousness is seperable from the biological nature of
>the brain.
>
>I'd go even further and say, consciousness (whatever it is)
>is also inseparable from the (unique) body it "inhabits."
>There are substantial contributions from the nervous system,
>and the functional condition of the sensory organs--and of
>course, the moment-to-moment chemical composition of the
>brain (i.e., neurotransmitters and other biochemical
>mediators which affect, for example, emotions.) Again, IMO.
>...tonyC
>
I think what you have to recognize is that consciousness in general is
certainly conceptually separable from the body/brain/mind. What you're
stressing is that a particular consciousness is not separable. Whether
or not the general consciousness is practically implementable on some
other platform however remains an issue.


Regards - Lester

"Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:BBD6C65A.12D2%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
| in article
0Fdsb.49581$Ec1.3303474@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net, KP_PC
| at k.p.collins@worldnet.att.net wrote on 11/11/03 2:46 PM:
|
| > "Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
| > news:BBD69100.12C8%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
| > | in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci@4ax.com, r norman
at
| > | rsn_@_comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:
| > |
| > | > On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it>
wrote:
| > | >
| > | >> [...]
| > | > That is, the brain IS a kind of machine
| > | > already, so yes, consciousness can
| > | > be produced by a machine.  And that
| > | > means that is could also be produced
| > | > by a non-biological machine.
| > | >
| > | The last sentence does not necessarily
| > | follow - it is a logical possibility that
| > | whatever it is that makes a machine
| > | "non-biological" also makes it
| > | incapable of consciousness.  I am not
| > | advocating that position, just
| > | pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.
| >
| > One has to take the last two sentences of
| > R. Norman's post as a unit. The 2nd-to-last
| > sentence implies "biological machine".
| >
| > ken
| >
| >
|
| Right. And the last sentence concludes that
| because there are "biological machines"
| capable of consciousness there must be
| "non-biological machines" also capable of
| consciousness.  This does not follow.  One
| way to see that is to draw a Venn diagram.

I stand Corrected. I skimmed-over the
"non-biological" in the last sentence.

I Apologize to you, Michael.

BTW, non-biological machine 'consciousness'
is 'easy'. For those who have it, a 'blueprint'
for such has been in AoK all along. [I'll gladly
discuss, in-person.]

[This is not to say that achieving the 'equivalent'
of Human Consciousness is "easy".]

Cheers,

ken [k. p. collins]

"Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@optonline.net> wrote in message
news:pIlsb.1855$hn3.941346@news4.srv.hcvlny.cv.net...
| [...]

| I'd go even further and say, consciousness
| (whatever it is) is also inseparable from the
| (unique) body it "inhabits."

| [...]

And the individually-unique experiences that
that 'body' has :-]

[For those who've been following the discus-
sion of NDT, this's a big part of why NDT's
understanding is useful - it provides a 'bridge'
between such necessarily-individually-unique
experience, and resultant individually-unique
Consciousnesses.

This 'bridge' is important because, without it,
folks tend to 'think' that everyone else shares
their individually-unique Consciousness, so,
when 'disagreements' occur, folks tend to
experience such occurrences as not-self
denying [manifesting 'moving away from'
directionality with respect to] self, when all
that's happening is that each nervous system
'perceives' the experiential stuff, inherent,
through the 'lens' of its own TD E/I-minimiz-
ation dynamics.

'Translate' via NDT's understanding, and the
impetus to Kill, for instance, is transformed
into awareness of TD E/I-minimization diff-
erentials, and the usefulness inherent in
seeking mutual TD E/I-minimization con-
vergence. The 'bridge' renders useful inform-
ation-processing work [and the futility inherent
in resort to use-of-force] 'visible'. The 'bridge'
is functional be-cause it translates everything
into TD E/I-minimization which =is= shared uni-
versally, even though experientially-driven
Consciousnesses are individually-unique.

'Disagree'?

Just trace your 'disagreement' back through
your individually-unique experience-differen-
tials, until you start synching-up, TD E/I-mini-
mization-wise. "Hey! We both have to eat." :-]

You know - instead of Killing not-self.]

You know - "Love your neighbor as you love
your[ ]self."

Want the 'same' TD E/I-minimization for your
'neighbor' as you want for your self.

Remove the absence-of-understanding.

Replace it with understanding.

Cross the 'bridge'.

Find ways in which you can help one another
achieve TD E/I-minimization - each in your
own way, but all the while, the Same-Stuff.]

ken [k. p. collins]

"r norman" <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote in message
news:vlc4rvsm5aodd5n77h59a07f3h68i7ofe7@4ax.com...
| On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 16:31:48 +1100, Matthew Kirkcaldie
| <Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au> wrote:
|
| >In article <8e53rvs4p64t9ba1njjfb2e3n7ufpnk6e2@4ax.com>,
| > r norman <rsn_@_comcast.net> wrote:
| >
| >> However, if it is true that consciousness is nothing more than
the
| >> working out of laws of physics and chemistry given a particular
albeit
| >> highly complex arrangement of molecules, organelles, and cells,
then
| >> once we understand the mechanisms it should be conceptually
possible
| >> to produce an artificial device that uses the same laws of
physics and
| >> chemistry with a rather different arrangement of non-biological
| >> components to acheive the same effect.
| >
| >So, to exaggerate that line of reasoning, it should be possible to
build
| >a hydrogen atom out of other non-elementary components and have it
| >behave the same way?  Or make a working atomic bomb out of
Meccano?
| >
| >I know these extrapolations are ridiculous but I make them to
point out
| >that the assertion that a process is created by the physical
properties
| >of its consituents does not imply that it could also be created by
| >different materials.  Right or wrong, I simply do not believe that
| >consciousness is seperable from the biological nature of the
brain.
| >
| >Most AI and connectionist approaches seem to me to be like piling
up
| >large heaps of components and hoping that they will become a 747
| >somehow.  Actually, more like piling up large heaps of sandwiches
and
| >hoping they will become a 747 somehow.
| >
|
| We are not really disagreeing, just having a lot of fun with
| disputations!
|
| You hit the nail on the head by your "assertion that a process is
| created by the physical properties oits consitutents does not
| imply..."  I originally included some form of computation or
| information processing as an essential part of consciousness.  In
my
| way of thinking, "computation" like "negative feedback regulation"
or
| "controlled release of energy" is a  "process" separate from its
| physical implementation.  Processing a broadcast electromagnetic
wave
| to produce a television picture with sound is the "same" whether
the
| machinery is vacuum tube or very large scale integrated circuitry.
I
| argue that "consciousness" is likely to be the same type of thing.
In
| computerese, it could be ported to a different platform.
|
| The failures of AI to date merely indicate the enormity of what we
| don't know.  At some point we are likely to figure it out.  I can't
| imagine that point coming even in the next few decades, though, if
| even in the next century!
|
| Where we strongly disagree is you believe that consciousness is
| inseparable from the biological nature of the brain.  If
consciousness
| lies in the physical implementation, then there must be something
| special about the structure of neurons.  But there isn't anything
| there that is not found (in one form or another) in virtually all
| cells!  Do all living cells have some form of nascent
consciousness?
| Then consciousness is an integral part of what we think of as
"life".
| I disagree.  It must be in the pattern of arrangement and
interaction
| of the nerve cells.  And patterns of interaction can be replicated
in
| different hardware.

[Sorry, I'm pushing 30+ hours without
sleeping consciousness, and am too tired
parse the lengthy prior discussion. Apol-
ogizing for the way my NG reader will
screw-up the justification.]

Cogent.

Replicate the energydynamics.

One thing that makes complete repication
of the energydynamics so hard is that the
Biology does all the infinitely-divisible
'Coulomb force' stuff so elegantly.

The other thing is that Consciousness
derives in TD E/I-minimization that occurs
within individually-unique experience -
so one cannot just replicate the energy-
dynamics. Given a system that is globally-
integrated via TD E/I-minimization, one still
has to replicate the energydynamics via
replication of experience [which is as close
to being Impossible as anything that I'm
aware of be-cause WDB2T has moved-on].

It's easier to just engineer a system that
does TD E/I-minimization [including 'drive'-
precedence-hierarchy prioritization [AoK,
\Ap5, Ap7], and not 'demand' that it replicate
a =particular= instance of biological Consci-
ousness.

Then just turn-it-on and turn-it-loose.

[And wait for it to learn about its inherent
TD E/I-minimization dynamics :-]

[Such learning must be optional. Hard-coding
it eliminates the possibility of Free Will.]

Cheers, Dr. Norman,

ken [k. p. collins]

In article <3fb25ab4.72496186@netnews.att.net>,
 lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote:

> I think what you have to recognize is that consciousness in general is
> certainly conceptually separable from the body/brain/mind. 

That may be so Lester - but electricity is conceptually seperable from 
magnetism, and yet the two are manifestations of a single phenomenon in 
reality.  The gedankenexperiment is an inadequate tool here because, 
surprise, it's a product of consciousness!

And to answer another bit of this thread, yes, I do believe that 
cellular properties contribute fundamentally to consciousness.  I don't 
believe my liver is conscious, but I do believe that (for instance) that 
the elements of biochemistry it shares with my brain are of funadmental 
importance to the type of consciousness which arises from my brain.  
It's not just the pattern of clicks, but the paracrine communication 
between cells and their interactions with the rest of the body.

In some ways I believe that the subtlety of interaction which is 
possible in a multidimensional biochemical system like the neurons of 
our brain, is what enables so many elements to interact to produce a 
cohesive experience.  Their biological nature may bind the neurons to a 
commonality which is impossible to achieve in a nonliving system.  Oops, 
there I go with a gedankenexperiment, I think I'll stop rambling here.

         Matthew.

"Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote in message news:<9yasb.6880$9_.283969@news1.tin.it>...
> Is consciousness produced only by brain or it could be produced by a machine
> too?

Ah, there are 2 different views here. One is called physicalism, the
other's called dualism.
1)Physicalism would hold that all that exists in the universe is
matter. There's no such thing as a non-physical soul. We don't
perceive anything like a mind, or a soul, so how do we know such
things exist?  What we call consciousness is produced by the brain.
2)Dualism holds that 2 distinct types of things that exist. One is
matter, the other is consciousness. What I am (or you are) is
consciousness. The body that I'm *in* (note the very careful use of
terminology here--people often ask questions like whether or not I
*have* a soul. That is, they identify themselves with the body and
wonder whether or not there's a soul *in* them, which leads to
puzzlement over what death is, problems of personal identity, etc.
etc.)

So you see, people who believe in physicalism would think of the brain
as somehow producing consciousness. Then, when the brain stops
functioning, there is no more consciousness "produced" by it.
  People who divide up existence into physical substances (that is,
something made of matter), and non-physical substances (soul, that is,
I, the thing that persists though the body I'm in continuously
changes), would say the *presence* of consciousness, that is, my
existence, makes this brain function. When I'm no longer there,
there's no point in my brain continuing to function.  In this view,
the brain is reduced to a purely mechanical device, just sending
signals to the right parts of the body, knowing about as much as any
other machine does, and "producing" consciousness the way my computer
produces consciousness (that is, not at all).
   The first view is fairly prevalent, and I think the reason for that
is
1)We observe that consciousness is very closely tied to the brain.
2)Most of the people who think of the brain as producing consciousness
don't think of consciousness as a "substance", so to explain
consciousness in terms of what they see (that is, the brain
controlling the operation of the body), they assume that the brain
somehow produces "awareness".

But an important point to make is just because there are correlations
between the brain and what I experience doesn't mean that the brain
itself is somehow producing consciousness, nor does it mean that it's
possible to explain consciousness strictly in terms of the physical
body.
  In other words it's entirely possible that there is this substance
that's composed of consciousness (which is what I am, what you are).
If I exist, then then this body functions. When there's no longer a
soul in it, then this body becomes a corpse. The soul would then be
the sentient thing--that is, what's capable of experiencing, what's
aware of the objects perceived by the physical body.  It's a bit of a
strange concept, because an "individual" is then not the body, but the
soul in the body. And knowledge, instead of being reduced to
electrical signals/composition of atoms, would then be stored in me
(the soul), that substance that's made of consciousness.
   What if the brain actually does store knowledge?
1)If brain cells get replaced over time, so should the knowledge
that's stored in it.
2)If knowledge is stored in my brain, rather than in me, then when I'm
no longer there, and my brain's still around, one would expect to find
"knowledge" contained in it!
3)The input that enters my eyes for example, is simply light waves.
This somehow would have to be converted into "knowing" what's out
there, which is bizarre--how would anything be able to extract
knowledge out of light rays?
   What if the brain actually does produce consciousness?
1)The question then would be, what is then aware of what the brain
produces?  You have a brain producing consciousness. For example,
let's assume that when light rays bouncing off an object enter the eye
& reach the brain, the brain somehow produces "awareness" (whatever
that means) of that object.  What then perceives this? If an object
produces light/sound, there has to be an observer? Clearly, **I** must
perceive whatever the brain is producing. What then am I? It follows
then that I am something distinct from the body, which would then go
against the concept that everything is physical in nature.

[note: I don't agree with the viewpoint that the brain produces some
sort of consciousness, then there is something which perceives it.
Rather, I like to think of the brain as a sort of an "engine" for the
body--just a bunch of parts mechanically functioning. Changes to it
however, result in an experience being perceived by me, since the body
is a medium for the soul. And this matter-consciousness gap is
something to be resolved later...]

2)Has anyone observed the brain producing consciousness? If not,then
there's no scientific evidence that the brain produces consciousness.
If the electricity observed is itself consciousness, then why can't
matter & energy found elsewhere be considered consciousness? If it's
argued that the brain still somehow does produce consciousness, we
then have a case of a physical substance producing something
non-physical.

   It seems like this viewpoint that the brain produces consciousness
is so problematic, and that question that you ask does raise an
interesting point. If the brain actually produces consciousness, isn't
it possible that some other machine can also produce consciousness?
What if a device were constructed that mimicked the electricity of
brain waves, would it then be "thinking" or producing consciousness?
The answer, at least to a dualist, would quite obviously be no, who
would argue that consciousness is a substance, whose presence makes
the body "alive", not something produced by matter.  Indeed, just
because there are changes to my body (controlled by my brain) whenever
I am conscious of something, does that mean that my brain has
something to do with "producing" consciousness or that consciousness
can be explained solely in terms of the brain?
   So essentially, substance dualism has to be thoroughly rejected
before the viewpoint that the brain produces consciousness can be
brought forth [which leads to a whole MESS of problems--you can't
define life, you can't explain the continuity to an individual through
a changing body, you can't explain how everything in the physical
world is deterministic but we are not, you can't explain what was
there in a living body that's not there in a dead body, it becomes
fuzzy to decide which material things are conscious, and what things
aren't, etc.)
Yes, I know I'm equating I=soul=consciousness, which I believe has
been done before. Perhaps more light could be shed concerning this?

Monsieur Lynx

"Matthew Kirkcaldie" <Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au>
wrote in message
news:Matthew.Kirkcaldie-4CE4B7.14052613112003@seagoon.newcastle.edu.a
u...
| In article <3fb25ab4.72496186@netnews.att.net>,
|  lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote:
|
| > I think what you have to recognize is that consciousness in
general is
| > certainly conceptually separable from the body/brain/mind.
|
| That may be so Lester - but electricity is conceptually seperable
from
| magnetism, and yet the two are manifestations of a single
phenomenon in
| reality.  The gedankenexperiment is an inadequate tool here
because,
| surprise, it's a product of consciousness!

Excellent point.

| And to answer another bit of this thread, yes, I do believe that
| cellular properties contribute fundamentally to consciousness.  I
don't
| believe my liver is conscious, but I do believe that (for instance)
that
| the elements of biochemistry it shares with my brain are of
funadmental
| importance to the type of consciousness which arises from my brain.
| It's not just the pattern of clicks, but the paracrine
communication
| between cells and their interactions with the rest of the body.
|
| In some ways I believe that the subtlety of interaction which is
| possible in a multidimensional biochemical system like the neurons
of
| our brain, is what enables so many elements to interact to produce
a
| cohesive experience.  Their biological nature may bind the neurons
to a
| commonality which is impossible to achieve in a nonliving system.
Oops,
| there I go with a gedankenexperiment, I think I'll stop rambling
here.
|
|          Matthew.

'ramble' away.

Your mind is finely-tuned, and such is
always Welcome.

[For those who have AoK, 'oopses',
'whoops-a-daisies', etc., are just the
superficial manifestations of the
"supersystem [re-]configuration"
dynamics that are discussed in Ap5,
and, so, constitute externally-observ-
able instances of the TD E/I-minimiza-
tion "ratchet-pawling" that occurs dur-
ing, and constitute what enables,
'climbing' the WDB2T energy-gradient
toward understanding ['movement
toward' Truth]. If one looks closely, one
also sees the Brilliance of the Evolution-
ary 'Engineer' in-there, because, in the
midsts of  'whoops-a-daisies', depending
upon whether or not TD E/I exists within
the rleatively-small TD E/I(up) 'range' that's
correlated with the activation of "inverting
reward" [AoK, Ap5], one can see the
simultaneous coupling [activation] of what
has been referred to as "sense of humor"
to the "ratchet-pawling" dynamics. This
activation of 'sense-of-humor' stuff results
in behavioral manifestations which assist
social interactors in enduring the external
experience of the 'whoops-a-daisies'.]

It's all so Beautiful.

And, Matthew, you are Adept in all of this.

Good for you.

'Climb' Swiftly and Enduringly.

ken [k. p. collins]

On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 14:05:26 +1100, Matthew Kirkcaldie
<Matthew.Kirkcaldie@removethis.newcastle.edu.au> in sci.cognitive
wrote:

>In article <3fb25ab4.72496186@netnews.att.net>,
> lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote:
>
>> I think what you have to recognize is that consciousness in general is
>> certainly conceptually separable from the body/brain/mind. 
>
>That may be so Lester - but electricity is conceptually seperable from 
>magnetism, and yet the two are manifestations of a single phenomenon in 
>reality.  The gedankenexperiment is an inadequate tool here because, 
>surprise, it's a product of consciousness!

I think that what I'm addressing insofar as consciousness is concerned
is whether there is a general explanation for consciousness which is
implementable on another platform. Obviously there is for electricity
because it is the product of material interactions so we can implement
the concept of electricity in different wires. The only issue I can
see is to what extent something similar can be said for consciousness.
>



Regards - Lester

"pavan03" <Monsieur_Lynx@brown.edu> wrote in message
news:68f44414.0311122058.5ab06b5d@posting.google.com...
| "Dio" <dadaismo@tin.it> wrote in message
news:<9yasb.6880$9_.283969@news1.tin.it>...
| > Is consciousness produced only by brain or it could be produced
by a machine
| > too?
|
| Ah, there are 2 different views here.
| One is called physicalism, the
| other's called dualism.
| 1)Physicalism would hold that all
| that exists in the universe is matter.

Not True.

All that Exists within physical reality is
energy.

"Matter" is comprised of 'condensed'
[relatively-concentrated] energy.

| There's no such thing as a non-physical soul.

This's an assumption that derives in absence-
of-understanding with respect to the full spec-
trum of energydynamics that are possible with-
in physical reality.

That is "soul" is just a verbal symbol that's used
during discourse, but whose refferants [instance-
of-use connotations] vary in accord with individ-
ually-unique experience.

That is, invoking the verbal-symbol, "soul"
does not 'instantiate' the Existence of
an entity that's specifically-correlated to the
individually-unique connotation[s] that the one
who invokes the verbal-symbol 'addresses'.
[The 'same' is True with respect to =all=
'language' usage, and it's good to keep-
such-straight.]

| We don't perceive anything like a mind, or a
| soul, so how do we know such things exist?

"Mind" is easy to perceive, sometimes, so
easy, as in Norman and Kirkcaldie's disc-
cussion, that the Existence of "mind" fairly
'grasps' one's own "mind", leaving it lifted-
up - thereby leaving one's own "mind", right-
there, flat-out Visible to one's self.

That which is only incompletely connoted by
"soul" is more 'difficult' to perceive, but most of
the 'difficulty' inherent derives in the fact that,
as above, the verbal-symbol, "soul", is routinely
invoked in individually-unique ways.

| What we call consciousness is produced by
| the brain.

It is, Verifiably, but only in a way that is rigorously-
coupled to external experiential energydynamics.

What breaks-down at death is this rigorous-
coupling between biological energydynamics
and universal energydynamics, which persist
even though the particular biological-eneregy-
dynamics' rigorous-coupling to them has brok-
en-down.

Big-Difference.

| 2)Dualism holds that 2 distinct types of things
| that exist.

That's ancient Dualism, that's typically attributed
to Rene Descarts [even though such attribution
does not, routinely, address what Descartes
addressed, which is another instance of individu-
ally-unique connotation presuming to 'be the
whole thing', when it is, in fact, just an individually-
unique 'view'.]

The actual Problem that's been inherent has been
the fact that individuals have presumed that their
individually-unique "mind"-sets, out of which arise
their individually-unique verbal-symbolic usage,
are, somehow, 'priviledged', in that they are pre-
sumed to instantiate energydynamics within the
nervous systems of other individuals that are 'ex-
actly-similar' to the energydynamics that under-
pinned the manifestation of the verbal-symbol
by the first individual.

Although this is approached in Maths, it just
doesn't happen within Human experience. [It
routinely doesn't happen in Maths be-cause
Maths has never [yet] encompassed all of
physical reality, which is why theoretical efforts
invoking Maths have always been 'replaced'
by subsequent theoretical efforts invoking
refined Maths.]

Anyway, there is a "duality" that exists at the
heart of the stuff that you are discussing. It is
that biological information-processing
["nervous"] systems function to 'seek' optimiz-
ation of an energydynamics 'goal', and Cogni-
tion, Affect, Volition and Behavior are produced
as by-products of the degree to which the
underpinning biological energydynamics are,
in fact, optimized.

[For those who have it, this is the "duality" that
is what's discussed in the "Automation of Know-
ing ms. [AoK].]

| One is matter, the other is consciousness.

=Both= are energydynamics.

| What I am (or you are) is consciousness.

What I am (or you are) is 100% energydynamics.

| The body that I'm *in* (note the very careful
| use of terminology here--people often ask
| questions like whether or not I *have* a soul.
| That is, they identify themselves with the
| body and wonder whether or not there's a
| soul *in* them, which leads to puzzlement
| over what death is, problems of personal
| identity, etc. etc.)

The body I'm in is 100% energydynamics.

| So you see, people who believe in
| physicalism would think of the brain
| as somehow producing consciousness.

It is the =interaction= of Universal energy-
dynamics and an individual subset of the
Universal energydynamics that is referred
to as constituting a nervous system
Verifiably 'produces' Consciousness.

| Then, when the brain stops functioning,
| there is no more consciousness
| "produced" by it.

The rigorous-coupling between the Univers-
al energydynamics and an individual in-
stance of biological energydynamics has
broken-down. The Universal energydynamics
continue, sans the individual instance of
biological energydynamics.

| People who divide up existence into physical
| substances (that is, something made of matter),
| and non-physical substances (soul, that is,
| I, the thing that persists though the body I'm in
| continuously changes),

What "persists" is 100% energy =dynamics=.

Within the energydynamics there is nothing
that 'persists' in a 'static' way.

| would say the *presence* of consciousness,
| that is, my existence, makes this brain function.

What makes nervous systems able to function
is the degree to which they are coupled to
the Universal energydynamics.

As this breaks-down, the ability of a nervous
system to 'function' breaks-down, in a rigor-
ously-coupled way.

| When I'm no longer there, there's no point
| in my brain continuing to function.

When the individual instance of the Universal
energydynamics that is a nervous system
breaks-down, the biological energydynamics
are 'no longer there'.


| In this view, the brain is reduced to a purely
| mechanical device, just sending signals to
| the right parts of the body, knowing about
| as much as any other machine does, and
| "producing" consciousness the way my
| computer produces consciousness (that is,
| not at all).

'Knowledge' of the Universal energydynamics
is literally embodied in the biological energy-
dynamics that constitute what is referred to as
"a nervous system".

The 'difference' that you address with respect
to "knowing" derives in the fact that the problems
that confront a biological system with respect
to its on-going functionality [with respect to its
Survival] are 'defined' experientially, and such
experiential 'definitions' are, 'typically', extremely-
very-much-more-delimited than are the Universal
energydynamics with respect to which robust
'Knowledge' is, in fact, embodied within nervous
systems.

That is, within commonplace experience,
'knowledge' with respect to how to acquire
'food' and 'shelter' has been deemed to 'be
relatively-practical, while all of the 'Knowledge'
of the Universal energydynamics that's right-there
Verifiably extant within nervous systems' biological
energydynamics has been deemed to 'be incon-
sequential'.

A closer look reveals that the 'deeming' inherent
has been Erroneous.

That is, it turned-out that the only way to Assure
acquiring 'food' and 'shelter' runs right-through
the middle of 'Knowing' the Universal energy-
dynamics.

[For those who've been following the discussion
of NDT's stuff in bionet.neuroscience over the
course of the last decade+, this "only-way"-ness
is what I've actually been discussing. This's been
the the 'finnish-line of the 'race' I've been 'running'
in b.n.]

|    The first view is fairly prevalent, and I think
| the reason for that is
| 1)We observe that consciousness is very closely
| tied to the brain.
| 2)Most of the people who think of the brain as
| producing consciousness don't think of
| consciousness as a "substance", so to explain
| consciousness in terms of what they see (that is,
| the brain controlling the operation of the body),
| they assume that the brain somehow produces
| "awareness".

Consciousness is =not= a "substance".

It is, as above, an individual subset of the
Universal energydynamics.

That is, it's 'just' energy, ordered in ways that
rigorously-couple its dynamics to [within] the
Universal energydynamics.

| But an important point to make is just
| because there are correlations between
| the brain and what I experience doesn't
| mean that the brain itself is somehow
| producing consciousness,

The brain, itself, doesn't.

It's as has been discussed above.

The biological energydynamics coupled to
the Universal energydynamics 'produce'
Consciousness.

[This's why one can 'talk one's self blue-in-
the-face', but, if no one hears [or otherwise
experiences one's 'talking one's self blue-
in-the-face'], no one's Consciousness
detects the stuff that's right-there in one's
'talking one's self blue-in-the-face'. So,
in the end, who is it to whom "publish or
perish" applies most-significantly? :-]

| nor does it mean that it's possible to
| explain consciousness strictly in terms
| of the physical body.

False. It's as above. The body embodies
the rirorous-coupling that exists between
the Universal energydynamics and the
body's individual instance of biological
energydynamics.

Just explain the rigorously-coupled energy-
dynamics.

[Whoops! It's already done :-]

|   In other words it's entirely possible that
| there is this substance that's composed
| of consciousness (which is what I am,
| what you are).

Nope. What I am, what you are, and what
anyone else is, is energydynamics.

| If I exist, then then this body functions.
| When there's no longer a soul in it,
| then this body becomes a corpse. The
| soul would then be the sentient thing--
| that is, what's capable of experiencing,
| what's aware of the objects perceived
| by the physical body.  It's a bit of a
| strange concept, because an "individual"
| is then not the body, but the soul in the
| body. And knowledge, instead of being
| reduced to electrical signals/composition
| of atoms, would then be stored in me
| (the soul), that substance that's made of
| consciousness.

When the biological energydynamics
break-down, to the degree of that, the
energy that was formerly in the biological
energydynamics 'just' returns to become
one with the Universal energydynamics.

There is no longer any rigorous-coupling
between the biological energydynamics
and the Universal energydynamics, and
why should there be? The biological energy-
dynamics have no relevance outside of
the body. So the energy that's relesaed
as the body breaks-down 'just' reverts to
being One with the Universal energy-
dynamics, and behaves accordingly.

|    What if the brain actually does store
| knowledge?

Brains do, but such 'knowledge-storage'
occurs as a by-product of nervous systems'
'seeking' to optimize their energydynamics
with respect to a biologically-relevant 'goal'.

'Funny' thing is that understanding the duality
inherent transforms nervous systems' function-
ing in a way that enables it to 'embrace' the
Universal energydynamics :-]

| 1)If brain cells get replaced over time, so
| should the knowledge that's stored in it.

First, 'knowledge' is, itself, dynamic, and
thank God that it is, because, during com-
monplace experience, there's nothing but
individual-uniqueness that must be handled
'socialably'. It wouldn't be functional to ad-
dress all the individual-uniqueness that's
encountered during comonplace experience
in a 'static', never-changing, way.

Second, the available Neuroscience experi-
mental evidence discloses that nerve-cell
'replacement' is delimited to hippocampal
stem cell activity, which does not 'replace'
the vast majority of nerve cells comprising
'the brain'.

Third, to the degree that such 'replacement'
does occur, the new cells' functionalities can
acquire their 'marching-orders' in interaction
with the cellular constituency that already
exists.

The most-significant thing remains the degree
of rigorous-coupling that exists between the
Universal energydynamics and the individual
instance of biological energydynamics that
is referred to as a "nervous system".

Be-cause of this rigorous-coupling, if the
Universal energydynamics alter, the
biological energydynamics alter.

'normally' such occurs as a result of the
interaction of individual instances of the
biological energydynamics.

Such interactive energydynamics also
embody the Universal energydynamics, and
occur in a way that's rigorously-coupled to
them.

| 2)If knowledge is stored in my brain,
| rather than in me, then when I'm no longer
| there, and my brain's still around, one
| would expect to find "knowledge"
| contained in it!

To the degree that the biological energy-
dynamics that constituted the living 'brain'
have broken-down, this's False.

'knowledge' is 'stored' in the biological
energydynamics.

| 3)The input that enters my eyes for
| example, is simply light waves.

Which, through your eyes, carry energy
into your nervous system, thereby impacting
upon the biological energydynamics of your
nervous system.

| This somehow would have to be converted
| into "knowing" what's out there, which is
| bizarre--how would anything be able to extract
| knowledge out of light rays?

It's easy be-cause the energy 'contained within'
the light is rigorously 3-Dimensionally-ordered
with respect to the Universal energydynamics
and the biological energydynamics are also
rigorously-ordered with respect to the Universal
energydynamics.

Consciousness 'says':

"See that telephone pole?"

"Walk around it, rather than trying to walk
through it."

Look and  see for yourself, 'Knowledge' of the
Universal energydynamics is right-there, through-
and-through, such rigorous-3-D-coupling of the
biological energydynamics to the Universal
energydynamics.

|    What if the brain actually does produce
| consciousness?

Again, it doesn't.

It's the rigorous-coupling of the biological
energydynamics to the Universal energy-
dynamics that does.

| 1)The question then would be, what is
| then aware of what the brain produces?
| You have a brain producing consciousness.
| For example, let's assume that when light
| rays bouncing off an object enter the eye
| & reach the brain, the brain somehow
| produces "awareness" (whatever that
 means) of that object.  What then perceives
| this? If an object produces light/sound,
| there has to be an observer? Clearly,
| **I** must perceive whatever the brain is
| producing. What then am I? It follows
| then that I am something distinct from the
| body, which would then go against the
| concept that everything is physical in nature.

False.

Experiencing one's 'local portion' of the
Universal energydynamics 'just' drives the
biological energydynamics that are rigorously-
coupled to the Universal energydynamics.

'Awareness' is in the biological energy-
dynamics' altering in a way that's rigorously-
coupled to the 'local portion' of the Universal
energydynamics that the biological energy-
dynamics have 'experienced'.

| [note: I don't agree with the viewpoint that
| [if?] the brain produces some sort of
| consciousness, then there is something
| which perceives it. Rather, I like to think of
| the brain as a sort of an "engine" for the
| body--just a bunch of parts mechanically
| functioning. Changes to it however, result
| in an experience being perceived by me,
| since the body is a medium for the soul.
| And this matter-consciousness gap is
| something to be resolved later...]

It stands Resolved.

It's all 'just' the 3-D energydynamics.

| 2)Has anyone observed the brain producing
| consciousness?

Yes. Your saying, above, that, "Changes to
[the brain] however, result in an experience
being perceived by me", indicates that =you=
have.

| If not,then there's no scientific evidence that
| the brain produces consciousness.

All one has to do is look in the Neuroscience
stacks. To the degree that anything in-there is
replicable, it directly addresses how nervous
systems' energydynamics interact with the
Universal energydynamics to yield Conscious-
ness.

The 'problem' has actually been that there's
so much Evidence substantiating the above,
that folks've just had a hard 'time' integrating
it all.

The "cup [of Evidence] overrunneth".

| If the electricity observed is itself
| consciousness, then why can't matter &
| energy found elsewhere be considered
| consciousness?

Be-cause such stuff does not possess
nervous systems' rigorous-3-D-coupling
to the Universal energydynamics.

Same reason one can't use water for a
chair, unless one performs work to lower
its temperature to alter its energydynamics
sufficiently to take it through the liquid->solid
phase transition.

Our nervous systems function in ways that
enable them to accomplish the exactly-
analogous thing with respect to their 'local
portions' of the Universal energydynamics,
and it's all Spectacularly-Wonderful because
they take 'just'-energy, and construct every-
thing else out of it, both internally and extern-
ally. When one walks from point A to point B,
for instance, one's nervous system does the
3-D-energydynamics-work necessary to
'construct' the stuff of that walk 100% out of
energy - just like when I froze the water to
construct a 'chair', our nervous systems
literally 'grasp' this or that 'scrap' of energy
within their 'local portions' of the Universal
energydynamics, and transform it into both
alterations to their own energydynamics
and, as overall Universal energydynamics
permit, alterations to their local portions' of
the Universal energydynamics.

| If it's argued that the brain still somehow
| does produce consciousness, we then
| have a case of a physical substance
| producing something non-physical.

It's all 'just' energydynamics.

All of it 'physical'.

A small 'portion' of the problem has been
the overly-loose conntation of the verbal-
symbol "physical".

The larger 'portion' of the problem has been
that folks've carried-over really-ancient
'conceptualizations' of "God", and have
persisted in invoking them [in a way that
amounts to dictating to God 'what God
must be' :-]

Why not just seek Truth, and find God?

You know - instead of trying to dictate to
God that God 'must be' this or that.

Why not just let God tell you what God is?

|    It seems like this viewpoint that the brain
| produces consciousness is so problematic,
| and that question that you ask does raise an
| interesting point. If the brain actually produces
| consciousness, isn't it possible that some
| other machine can also produce consciousness?
| What if a device were constructed that
| mimicked the electricity of brain waves, would
| it then be "thinking" or producing consciousness?

Not necessarily. One can 'mimic' brain waves
with a tape recorder.

But one can see that, while its functioning is
rigorously-coupled to the Universal energy-
dynamics, the tape recorder does not replicate
the 3-D energydynamics of a nervous system.

| The answer, at least to a dualist, would quite
| obviously be no, who would argue that
| consciousness is a substance, whose
| presence makes the body "alive", not
| something produced by matter.

Energy, and the ability to 'consume' it,
in a way that's rigorously-coupled to the
Universal energydynamics in a 'moving
toward' way, is what "makes the body
`alive`".

| Indeed, just because there are changes
| to my body (controlled by my brain)
| whenever I am conscious of something,
| does that mean that my brain has
| something to do with "producing"
| consciousness or that consciousness
| can be explained solely in terms of the
| brain?

It does "mean that [your] brain has some-
thing to do with `producing' conscious-
ness", but it does not "mean that con-
sciousness can be explained solely in
terms of the brain".

The latter requires that the rigorous-
coupling of the biological energy-
dynamics to the Universal energy-
dynamics be addressed, rigorously.

|    So essentially, substance dualism has
| to be thoroughly rejected before the
| viewpoint that the brain produces
| consciousness can be brought forth

Nope, one just has to see the energy-
dynamics.

| [which leads to a whole MESS of
| problems--you can't define life,

See above in this discussion.

| you can't explain the continuity to an
| individual through a changing body,

See above in this discussion.

| you can't explain how everything in the
| physical world is deterministic but we
| are not,

We are, the Universal energydynamics
are just exceedingly-'Generous'.

| you can't explain what was there in a
| living body that's not there in a dead
| body,

See above in this discussion.

| it becomes fuzzy to decide which
| material things are conscious, and
| what things aren't, etc.)

Only those that are rigorously-coupled
to the Universal energydynamics in a
'moving toward' way are.

| Yes, I know I'm equating I=soul=
|consciousness, which I believe has
| been done before. Perhaps more light
| could be shed concerning this?
|
| Monsieur Lynx

Why not just seek Truth, and find God?

Cheers,

ken [k. p. collins]

Why is there SOO much reluctance to think of the existence of
consciousness as a substance? If it does turn out that there is an
actual substance that is consciousness, then it would turn out that
people are "imagining" that the brain is producing consciousness.
  One interesting view was raised--the possibility that I am
energy-dynamics. Here is a hypothetical scenario. I am aware of my own
existence. Likewise can we say that some changes in energy is aware of
it's own existence?  Again, I think the difficulty that is seen here
is as follows
1)When I exist, there are certain changes in the energy in my body. 
2)When I'm no longer there, then the body becomes lifeless (or
typically, a physicalist would think of it the other way around, when
the brain stops functioning, then I'm no longer there)
3)Thus, what I am is the energy dynamics of the body.

The problem with this view is as mentioned above, changes in energy
are just, well electrons moving around/heat dissipation/etc. (imagine
an electrical generator producing the same patterns of electricity as
the brain--it isn't "alive" or "thinking").
  A dualist perspective would be this substance that's present in the
body makes the brain function. When this substance is taken out, the
brain stops functioning (that is, there's no need for my brain to send
signals to my heart when I'm no longer there!).  But bear in mind that
a soul is a "non-physical" substance--that is, it's made of
consciousness rather than energy, or matter.
  Try and conceptualize this view--it's very hard to do. I got a
patronizing response as if he were implying "haha, you think that
consciousness is a SUBSTANCE?!" or "this guy doesn't know that
consciousness is a function of the brain?!". That view is called
physicalism.
   So, in other words, if we view that energydynamics of the body as
something external to me, then not only is it consistent with observed
phenomena, it also gives an explanation as to WHY the brain functions,
and WHY I remain throughout my life though the energy in my body is in
constant flux.
   Is it possible that there is no enduring substance such as a soul? 
Well, okay, for the physicalist it becomes very hard to define life
without a concept of a non-physical soul:
1)Life is composed of cells--nope, a dead body is also composed of
cells
2)Life is composed of living cells--nope, circular definition, what's
a "living" cell?
3)A living cell is a cell that's carrying out life processes (well,
certain cells don't reproduce, yet they would be termed alive, also a
neutered animal would be considered alive, though it's incapable of
reproduction--so being alive doesn't necessarily mean capable of
reproduction)

A nice, cleancut definition would be as follows:
Life is a body inhabited by a soul. The body is what's *physically*
there. The soul is a non-physical substance. You don't HAVE a soul.
Rather, you are a soul, that makes the body you're in function. The
fact that humans have souls is quite evident from the fact that *I*
exist. If I'm not there, then this body would no longer function--it
would be dead.  Animals possessing souls is also evident for those who
have pets (that is, the brain of the pet doesn't produce feelings, nor
does it perceive feelings, it's the "soul" that's in a pet--when taken
out, the pet, that is the body of a pet stops functioning=death).

And I think rather than making logical arguments against this, the
issue is often brushed aside. After brushing aside the possibility of
a soul existing, scientists then proceed to explain consciousness.
Well, clearly the brain controls the functioning of the body.
Therefore, it must be producing "feelings" as well. Or maybe
consciousness is the functioning of the brain. After all, if the brain
controls the body then what purpose would a soul serve? So they might
argue...
   The difficulty here is that they identify themselves with the body,
and then try to visualize the soul as something "in" them, or
something "external" to them. The soul controls any living body, as
does the brain. How's that possible? Here's an analogy that some might
find a bit odd, but I think it brings out the dualist perspective:

Think of a car--what controls the car? Is it the engine? Or is the
driver? Well, they both do. Whenever I want to do something, we
observe changes in the engine(because it has to send the right signals
to the right parts of the car). It would be silly to say that the
engine has something to do with what the driver is aware of!!!
  What the hell is the analogy I'm making? The brain is just a bunch
of parts. Like an engine of a car controlling the car, my brain
controls the physical functioning of the body.  Neither "produces"
consciousness,nor does either of them have "mystical" abilities like
thinking/knowing/etc.  Rather, just the way we think of the driver of
a car as knowing what's going on or controlling the operation of the
car rather than attributing such things to the engine, think of a
distinct soul(this is what you are) controlling the functioning of
*your* body. This soul(what you are, not something that you have) is
what's capable of knowing, NOT the brain.  What if there is no soul?
Well, in that case, there's nothing there making the brain function!
The analogy does have its limitations (as changes to the engine don't
cause the driver to experience!), but it points out the relative
functions of a brain & soul, from a dualist standpoint. They're
intimately connected, but still distinct "substances", one sentient,
the other just insentient matter.

Second analogy: But changes to the brain result in me experiencing an
emotion--therefore experience must somehow be tied to the brain.
   Take any object I posess. If something were to happen to it, say
someone were to damage it, it would produce a feeling of anger in me,
correct? Look at this analogy VERY carefully: changes to one object
would cause an emotion in a *completely* different location!!  That
object has nothing to do with what I  experience!  Why can't this be
explained using some scientific process? If an identical object that
belonged to someone else were to be damaged, the same feelings of
anger would not be produced in me. The analogy to be emphasized here
is that though certain changes to the brain might result in me(the
soul) experiencing, it doesn't mean that experience has something to
do with the brain.  Rather,it could be the case that something that
affects the brain, because it's *my* brain, causes me to experience a
particular emotion. Nonetheless, just like that object in that
analogy, the brain doesn't have anything to do with experience.

The dualist perspective is a bit strange--I'm trying to present
analogies as best as I can to better understand it, but of course,
like any analogy they have their limitations.
  To better understand it requires distinguishing your existence from
that of the body, though changes to one can affect the other.  Yes, I
*think* that I am this body, however that does not mean that I
actually am this body--it's a case of the real self vs. the apparent
self.  The neat part about dualism is that it completely divides
existence into 2 categories, so you never run into problems like
"well, the energy here is aware of its own existence, but the energy
there is not." , "The body I'm in now is not the body I had 10 years
ago, yet I'm still *me*" , etc.

Monsieur Lynx

"pavan03" <Monsieur_Lynx@brown.edu> wrote in message
news:68f44414.0311131204.d863f8b@posting.google.com...
| [...]

|    Take any object I posess. If something
| were to happen to it, say someone were
| to damage it, it would produce a feeling
| of anger in me, correct?

Not necessarily.

| Look at this analogy VERY carefully:
| changes to one object would cause an
| emotion in a *completely* different
| location!!  That object has nothing to do
| with what I  experience!  Why can't this be
| explained using some scientific process?

It was, decades ago.

| If an identical object that belonged to
| someone else were to be damaged, the
| same feelings of anger would not be
| produced in me.

I discussed how and why  the stuff of your
analogy happens, within a nervous system,
in my reply to your prior post.

As you experience the object you posess,
your brain is optimizing it's energydynamics
with respect to the sensory and motor neural
[nerve cell] activation that occurs within your
brain.

This energydynamics optimization =always=
takes a particular 'form'. Within it, neural
activation that would cause more neural
activation is minimized, and neural activation
that causes less neural activation is maximized.

Call the former "excitation", and denote it as
"E", and call the latter "inhibition", and denote
it as "I", and the optimization of your brain's
energydynamics can be described mathem-
atically as the minimization of the ratio of
excitation to inhibition, or E/I-minimization.

So as you experience the object you posess,
E/I-minimization happens.

Many, many things have been going on within
your brain as you experienced your posession,
but everything that happens within your brain,
happens in this E/I-minimization way.

Put the object away, and go about your daily
affairs.

A week later, take the object out and experience
it some more.

You 'recognize' it as being 'familiar', and that
recognition happens be-cause, when you ex-
perience your posession again, the degree
of energydynamics optimization that your brain
achieved while you formerly experienced your
posession - the E/I-minimization - is relatively-
quickly converged upon once again.

One of the many, many things that was going
on within your brain as you experienced your
posession was that the activation-relationship
of the part of your brain that functions to actualize
the subjective experience of "emotion" was
becoming 'optimally'-aligned, via E/I-minimiza-
tion, with respect to your sensory and motor ex-
perience with respect to your possession.

When someone else damages your posession,
the modifications to its structure, and/or its func-
tionality, result in your sensory and motor ex-
periencing of it being immediately rendered
different from the way it was prior to your pos-
ession's being damaged.

This rapid change in your sensory and motor
experiencing of your posession results in a
rapid de-optimization of the neural energy-
dynamics within your brain. Excitation rapidly
increases and inhibition rapidly decreases [the
ratio of excitation to inhibition, E/I, rapidly in-
creases]. Your formerly-aligned "emotion" be-
comes rapidly unaligned, and this is experi-
enced as stereotypical "anger".

In the second half of your analogy, because
the object in question is not your posession,
you had less sensory and motor experience
with it, so less E/I-minimization happened
within your brain with respect to its structure
and functionality, so, when it is damaged,
the relative change you experience in E/I
within your brain is relatively-small, and
there is only a relatively-small de-alignment
of "emotion", so you experience relatively-small
"emotionality".

What's here is extremely over-simplified, but
it is, essentially, what happens within your brain
as the differential responses to the objects'
being damaged occur.

It's 100% the rigorously-coupled internal and
external energydynamics.

What's here also describes what's going on
in Iraq these days, and what happened here
in the U. S. A. after the terrorist attacks of
2001-09-011.

The Same-Stuff has underpinned all War -
all of "man's inhumanity to man", since the
dawn of Human History.

So these are not 'whimsical' matters, and it is
important that they be gotten-straight.

K. P. Collins

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