🚀 go-pugleaf

Hi,

"Nam D. Nguyen" <namducnguyen@shaw.ca> skrev i melding 
news:PllTj.114203$Cj7.43485@pd7urf2no...
> Tron wrote:

>>
>> Yes. The problem is that we only have inferential information about any 
>> such correspondence, and about the "actual state of affairs".
>
> I think you meant 'and *not* about the "actual state of affairs"'. Right?

/AFAICS the wording of your question is ambiguous.
Reading A: "We have only inferential information about correspondence,
and no information whatsoever about the actual state of affairs";
Reading B: "We have only inferential information about correspondence,
but this reservation is restricted in scope, and does not include
information about the actual state of affairs, about which we _do_ have 
information"./

Reading A: That would be my position, approximately.

Reading B:
Depends on which philosopher and philosophy you subscribe to.
Going off the Popper end of epistemology, we might say that we can make true 
negative claims about reality, which are occasioned by reality resisting our 
efforts to manipulate it, but whenever we succeed in manipulating it, we 
cannot be certain that our explanation of why this happened really captures 
any actual state of affairs; and so we are not justified in making true 
positive claims about reality.

And it is because we do not, under this perspective, have access to the one 
member of the pair that is to be compared, that the conclusion about 
correspondence is inferential.

OTOH, some epistemologies, like strict empiricism, permit certainty of 
immediate sensory awareness;
however, strict empiricism depends on some premises which deny us the 
ability to draw any conclusions from the content of immediate sensory 
awareness.

Regards,

T