🚀 go-pugleaf

Tron wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> "Nam D. Nguyen" <namducnguyen@shaw.ca> skrev i melding 
> news:PllTj.114203$Cj7.43485@pd7urf2no...
>> Tron wrote:
> 
>>> Yes. The problem is that we only have inferential information about any 
>>> such correspondence, and about the "actual state of affairs".

>> I think you meant 'and *not* about the "actual state of affairs"'. Right?
> 
> /AFAICS the wording of your question is ambiguous.

Funny. I only meant to ask if you had made a statement equivalent to *your*
"Reading A"! My question is if you indeed meant so say:

Reading A2:

   'The problem is that we only have inferential information about any
    such correspondence, and *not* about the "actual state of affairs"'.

which is, as I've mentioned, equivalent to your "Reading A", which you
claimed below as your position. Nothing ambiguous on my part, I don't think.

> Reading A: "We have only inferential information about correspondence,
> and no information whatsoever about the actual state of affairs";

> Reading B: "We have only inferential information about correspondence,
> but this reservation is restricted in scope, and does not include
> information about the actual state of affairs, about which we _do_ have 
> information"./
> 
> Reading A: That would be my position, approximately.
> 
> Reading B:
> Depends on which philosopher and philosophy you subscribe to.
> Going off the Popper end of epistemology, we might say that we can make true 
> negative claims about reality, which are occasioned by reality resisting our 
> efforts to manipulate it, but whenever we succeed in manipulating it, we 
> cannot be certain that our explanation of why this happened really captures 
> any actual state of affairs; and so we are not justified in making true 
> positive claims about reality.
> 
> And it is because we do not, under this perspective, have access to the one 
> member of the pair that is to be compared, that the conclusion about 
> correspondence is inferential.
> 
> OTOH, some epistemologies, like strict empiricism, permit certainty of 
> immediate sensory awareness;
> however, strict empiricism depends on some premises which deny us the 
> ability to draw any conclusions from the content of immediate sensory 
> awareness.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> T
> 
>