🚀 go-pugleaf

Don't blame me, I voted for chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers).
>(1) It's logically possible that there could be a physical replica
>of me without any conscious states.
>
>(2) Therefore the existence of conscious states is a further fact,
>over and above the physical facts (i.e. it is contingent relative
>to the physical facts).
>
>(3) Therefore dualism is true.
>
>If there's anything wrong with this argument, it has to be at premise
>(1).  I confess that this premise seems obviously true to me, but
>some people would deny it.

I would, at least, deny that it's *obviously* true.  Consider:  If dualism
is false, then mind cannot be separated from matter; therefore, an object
which lacks consciousness, no matter how much it looks like you, cannot
be a complete replica of you.  If consciousness is a dynamic, ongoing
chemical reaction in your brain, an event rather than a substance, then
that reaction is a part of your physical structure.  A replica would have
to include it, and so the replica would therefore possess consciousness
as well.

Your first premise should be changed to:  "*If dualism is true,* then it
is possible that there could be a physical replica of me without any
conscious states."

-- 
"This coffee is my blood, this breakfast burrito is my flesh.  And
 it cost me 89 cents, so get your goddamned own." - Jeff Lester, "Saint 11"