🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Aug27.191548.9076@klaava.Helsinki.FI>, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> In article <BtnLty.JC@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> >
|> >In article <1992Aug27.143116.16970@dcs.qmw.ac.uk>, arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
|> >|> In <1992Aug26.095740.17255@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
|> >|> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
|> >|> 
|> >|> >it's not at
|> >|> >all clear that philosophical problems are amenable to scientific
|> >|> >solutions.  Having said that, one of the reasons I'm using set theory in
|> >|> >metaphysics is to try to bring some objectivity into the field.
|> >
|> >Objectivity, no.  Precision, yes.
|> 
|> I meant here objective as opposed to _subjective_ (and should have said
|> so).  If philosophers agree to use the same formal language then at
|> least they agree on something...

I *know* that's what you meant!  But we *don't* all agree on the
same formal language ('theory' would be better than 'language'
here, by the way).  E.g., which set theory turns *you* on?  ZF,
VGB, NF, ML?  Why not transfinite type theory?  Why not category
theory?  Mereology, anyone?  Is your choice based perhaps on
comparing the ontologies of these theories?  The sets of theorems?
The ease of use? Again, you get precision, and not objectivity.
The history of set theory is the history of class struggle.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm