🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Btp2yx.E5K@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com 
(Gary Merrill) writes:

>In article <1992Aug27.191548.9076@klaava.Helsinki.FI>, amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>|> In article <BtnLty.JC@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>|> >
>|> >In article <1992Aug27.143116.16970@dcs.qmw.ac.uk>, arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
>|> >|> In <1992Aug26.095740.17255@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
>|> >|> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>|> >|> 
>|> >|> >it's not at
>|> >|> >all clear that philosophical problems are amenable to scientific
>|> >|> >solutions.  Having said that, one of the reasons I'm using set theory in
>|> >|> >metaphysics is to try to bring some objectivity into the field.
>|> >
>|> >Objectivity, no.  Precision, yes.
>|> 
>|> I meant here objective as opposed to _subjective_ (and should have said
>|> so).  If philosophers agree to use the same formal language then at
>|> least they agree on something...
>
>I *know* that's what you meant!  But we *don't* all agree on the
>same formal language ('theory' would be better than 'language'
>here, by the way).  E.g., which set theory turns *you* on?  ZF,
>VGB, NF, ML?  Why not transfinite type theory?  Why not category
>theory?  Mereology, anyone?  Is your choice based perhaps on
>comparing the ontologies of these theories?  The sets of theorems?
>The ease of use? Again, you get precision, and not objectivity.
>The history of set theory is the history of class struggle.

But I didn't mean _theory_.  The point I was making was just that
Analytical philosophers all employ formal logic, and first order
predicate logic is used in many contexts by the vast majority.  Set
theory can be expressed in this logic as well.  So I still say it's
a question of objectivity too.  The philosophers accept a common idiom
and agree to respect its grammar, conventions, etc.  This allows them
to work together better and not fight over interpretation as much
as other schools.