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Article #279Re: Dualism
From: Barry Merriman
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 03:34
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1992 03:34
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2596 bytes
In article <1992Sep11.231731.7954@galois.mit.edu> tycchow@riesz.mit.edu (Timothy Y. Chow) writes: > Consider a computer program, written in C. What kind of entity is it? Is > it an electronic entity? Well, perhaps---but what about printouts of the > computer program? We tend to say that those are also computer programs. So > maybe a computer program is a sequence of ASCII characters. Well, what > about a French version of the same program? > > The analogy with "mind" should be clear. Even if all minds that we know of > occur in human beings, this doesn't automatically guarantee that "mind" is a > biological entity > > All this suggests that "mind" is one of those ill-defined philosophical > concepts that Barry Merriman so despises, and not a biological concept. Yes, that is true. Then my reaction is: maybe it doesn't matter if we define precisely what 'mind' is. 'mind' is a term humans made up to label a human property, and attempts to generalize, abstract or make it more precise may simply not be important. (Such things are possible, but may have no significance, as they are just arbitrary modifications of the meaning, and don't really hold any new insight.) Similarly, 'computer program' labels a broad class, and it may simply not be important to have a precise critieria as you ask for above. One can always make an exacting specification, but it may just be arbitrary. This sort of issue used to plague AI and more recently AL (Artificial Life)---i.e. formulate a definition of the thing in question. I think now folks realize a definition is not so important, because no great definition pops out as us above all others---suggesting there is really no precise phenomena to be defined. Its one of those: we'll know it when we see it things. And one just has to accept such things. As for minds, when we develop think machines, I imagine we'll just call them electronic minds, call ours biological minds, and not worry about the precise relation between them. -- Barry Merriman UCLA Dept. of Math UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!usc!sdd.hp.com!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!ucla-cs!ucla-ma!news From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: Dualism Message-ID: <1992Sep12.033433.15594@math.ucla.edu> Date: 12 Sep 92 03:34:33 GMT References: <1992Sep11.231731.7954@galois.mit.edu> Sender: news@math.ucla.edu Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department Lines: 47