🚀 go-pugleaf

In <17oirjINNj4e@agate.berkeley.edu> lizi@ocf.berkeley.edu (Cosma R. Shalizi) writes:


>       * "Packetization" of a quantity does not imply that it is
>a substance.

       It is either a blob of something with more-or-less
definable boundaries, or it's not an object: that's the
objectivist view. If you reject the 'reality' of objects
altogether, however, you can say almost anything and still not
contradict yourself. If you want to say something comes in a
blob, but is not a substance, go ahead. It's your universe,
subjectively speaking.

>       Motion - by your own account _not_ a substance - is
>"packetized."

       Motion may not be packetized. Just because electrons
occupy only certain states or shells in an atom _most of the
time_, doesn't imply that they don't move through space between
those states (whatever those states are). In the macroscopic
world, transitions between states are often swift compared to a
system's tenancy in a given state. For example, automobile
engines are almost always either on or off, almost never
(statistically speaking) "starting". A digital computer operates
by means of switches, so from the perspective of the program all
bits are ON or OFF; but bottom line all computers are analog.
Quantum physics arose as a certain small group of people became
fascinated by playing with equations. Only later was it supposed
the world might actually _be_ that way. Even the inventors didn't
intend _that_. _That_ was the result of the naivete of students
being transformed into dogma.

>       * The "mathematical formalisms used to describe quantum
>emission are actual"   - well, now, what does _that_ mean? That
>they are actual mathematical   formalisms? Hardly a point worth
>debating. You mean that they are _true_.   Quite possibly there
>are other mathematical formalisms that would do just   as well.
>In light of your comments below, I should say that no non-mathe-
> matical formalisms will give us the information we are asking
>for - who   will emit what when? - since it is quantitative (i.e.
>mathematical) infor-   mation we want. But they _do_ match the
>phenomena (to within the limits   of experimental error, et
>cetera, et cetera),

       Mathematics is for description. Scientific models are not
based on mathematics, they are _described_ using mathematics.
Underlying the new physics is a conceptual framework. General
relativity invokes geometry as explanation, by saying that
gravitation is _caused_ by curvature of space.  This is not
describing nature with mathematics, this is projecting
mathematical notions onto nature as explanation. Quantum physics
does this with probability. Electrons aren't just hard to pin
down, they're _inherently probabilistic_. The mistake here is
obvious. Mathematics is descriptive, not prescriptive. This is
the root problem with the new physics.

>       AND no better alternatives are "on the market" AND we can
>derive them from more general bits of math whose other testable
>predictions are also confirmed gives us some reason - but not, of
>course, proof - for accepting them as valid.

       During the history of the new physics, concepts have been
derived from each other mathematically, without reference to
nature. Originally there was some skepticism about the validity
of doing this. The prime example of this is Bohr's explanation of
electron shells and emission lines, which was so obscure that
Einstein said it "appeared to [him] like a miracle and appears as
a  miracle even today. This is the highest form of musicality in
the sphere of thought." (It would be interesting to hear a
definition of "musicality in the sphere of thought" especially
for you hard-tech types who think science proceeds logically and
reasonably). Today, having lost all sense of history and the
purpose of science, the jejune students of the new physics (like
many on this group) don't understand what all the fuss is, about
"objectivity". At any rate, perhaps the point is apparent that
much intuition is involved in scientific "progress". If you think
certainty resides in mathematical derivation, dream on.

>       * The Uncertainty Principle does not just apply to energy
>and duration, but to _any_ two observables whose operators are
>non-commuting - e.g., position and momentum. It can be derived
>from some fairly simple theorems about vector spaces, the psi
>wave and operators - I've done so, and so's every- one else who
>passed undergraduate QM here. There are even more or less
>intuitive arguments for the UP, at least as regards
>position/momentum and energy/duration, e.g., "What do you mean
>this thing has _a_ momentum? It has values of k all over the
>place!"

       You say the U.P. can be derived from simple theorems about
vector spaces, psi waves etc. What you don't say is that it can
be induced from empirical evidence. It is another
self-referential theory about measurement, like relativity.
Science consists of a unidirectional flow of information about
the natural world into the human processing system. (Except when
certain notions are barfed back up.) Models of real systems
should follow massive collection of data about those systems.
(The theory of heliocentrism, cell theory, germ theory,
evolution, atom theory all formed this way.) In the new physics
we have the creation of massively complex theories based on
literally zero data. GR is a classic of this genre. Physical
interpretation of the psi function you mentioned _followed_ -- by
years -- its acceptance! "Bravo! Brilliant!" they cried. Then
later, quietly asked, "....But what does it mean?" This is
something, I admit: but is it _science_?

>       * I have read (in the Macmillan _Encyclopedia of
>Philosophy_) that von Neumann   was able to derive most if not
>all of QM _starting from_ the uncertainty   principle. I cannot
>vouch for this myself, however. If so, given the   very great
>success of QM, it seems unlikely that the uncertainty principle
>and its implications are so much moonshine swilled by the
>stubborn   adherents of the nefarious dominant paradigm; though
>it is of course log-   ically possible that this is so, and that
>pigs will fly out of your monitor   as you read this sentence.

       As for the "very great success of QM", compared to what?
Geocentricity was successful. The flint arrowhead too. Or
conversely, shall we list its failures? Has it had very great
success becoming consistent with the other great subjectivist
doctrine, relatitivty? Has it had very great success in avoiding
paradox? In creating a humanly comprehensible cosmology?

       As for your parellel point, a wrong consensus always
exists prior to new discoveries. That's why they call them new.
Your reasoning is like thinking that a stock will go up because
it's gone up in the past. A better method is to understand the
roots of change.

>       * Why do you think that the overthrow of a paradigm could
>not be accomplished   on the evidence of "some little experiment
>someone does somewhere?" What   if, say, someone repeatedly and
>accurately measures a velocity of   400,000 km/s for an electron?

       I admit that large structures can be brought down by
cleverly placed charges, even small ones. That's the art of
demolition. The problem is, those in positions to set the charges
are the least likely to. The other defense is to claim results
probable under other paradigms prove your paradigm, and to
interpret contradictory results in your own favor. I can cite
several examples of how both of these strategies are used by
subjectivist physicists today. But thus it has always been. The
new physics will be brought down by experiment, however. There's
no other way.ÿ

>Cosma Rohilla Shalizi

      John E. Snodgrass
      -----------------
      snodgras@crash.cts.com