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Article #365Re: Evolutionary Epistemology
From: Barry Merriman
Date: Fri, 04 Sep 1992 00:26
Date: Fri, 04 Sep 1992 00:26
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2748 bytes
In article <Bu01JK.C4y@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes: > > > Most of this stuff is lifted from an old paper of my > wife's: "Can Darwinian Inheritance Be Extended from Biology to > Epistemology?", This provides a good example of what I consider the bad philosophy of science. Not your wifes paper (she is essentially correct), but the fact that philosophers would try to abstract Darwinian evolution and then go around asking if this or that thing is a Darwinian evolution. As usual, the philosophers desire to develop a theory of some incredibly grand thing (epistemology), and end up with useless mush. The value of Darwins (and derived) theory of evolution is that it answers questions about how traits are acquired and fixed in populations, how new species develop, etc. When coupled with genetics, it provides a complete, quantitative and predictive mechansim for biological evolution. Epistemology is simply not open to a similar degree of quantification. Even if epistemology did turn out to be a 'Darwinian system' by someones definition, that doesn't change what epistemology is: the historical development of ideas would still be a very vague, unpredictible process lacking simple unifying ideas, and certainly little predictive power, as there is no underlying genetic code which enforces an orderly development process. > And the source of new concepts > is not located in other concepts, but in the mental activity of > some human being. Consequently, the way in which concepts are > "inherited" is very unlike the way in which genes are inherited. > Genes replicate themselves, but concepts must be "replicated" by > human beings. At the level of the mushy theory desired by the philosopher, one could easily refute these criticisms. Genes only replicate themselves upon a given chemical subtrate. This substrate is prone to mutation. One could say human minds are the substrate on which ideas replicate, and it just happens to be a substrate very prone to mutation. The fact that then mutation would be the dominant factor in this theory makes it a useless theory, but philosophers seem undaunted by such. -- Barry Merriman UCLA Dept. of Math UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)
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Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!ucla-cs!ucla-ma!news From: barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) Subject: Re: Evolutionary Epistemology Message-ID: <1992Sep4.002657.2346@math.ucla.edu> Sender: news@math.ucla.edu Organization: UCLA, Mathematics Department References: <Bu01JK.C4y@unx.sas.com> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 92 00:26:57 GMT Lines: 53