🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep14.005454.16209@sco.com> evanh@sco.COM (Evan Hunt) writes:

>No, Mr. Chalmers, that is not what is in question.  What I've been
>trying to establish is that your "probably correct" syllogistic
>proof of dualism is circular, because it requires the prior
>assumption that dualism is true.  The fact that I personally
>believe physicalism to be true is irrelevant to the discussion;
>I'm well aware that my belief is unprovable.

The truth or otherwise of physicalism is precisely what this thread
is all about -- see the subject header.  So far, we've more or less
agreed that the truth of dualism stands or falls with the logical
possibility of a zombie replica of me.  Charges of "circularity"
aside, it would seem that the way to proceed would be to think
about how to establish or disestablish that logical possibility,
by means other than a prior assumption of physicalism or dualism.

>To recapitulate the entire discussion:  You presented an argument
>for dualism which you said was "probably correct", and its first
>premise was that a nonconscious exact duplicate of your body could
>be constructed.  I pointed out that such a duplicate could only
>be nonconscious if physicalism is false--which means that you had
>been silently assuming dualism to be true before you started.

Actually, I never said that a nonconscious exact duplicate of my
body could be constructed -- in fact, that's almost certainly
false.  I simply said that the idea is coherent (which is all
that the argument needs).

>Perhaps you're using one of those slippery definitions of "possibility"
>that we were discussing the other day.  If you mean something by
>"logical possibility" that I don't, then this whole discussion's
>been pointless.  The way I see it, a zombie replica is only possible
>if dualism is true, and impossible if physicalism is; in either case
>you can't prove anything about the world by asserting one or the
>other.

By "logical possibility" I mean, straightforwardly, logical possibility,
or conceptual coherence, or whatever you like to call it.  What I
*don't* mean is empirical possibility.  On the face of it, the notion
of the zombie replica of me seems entirely coherent, regardless of
its empirical plausibility.  Somebody such as yourself who wishes
to deny its logical possibility had best provide some kind of argument
showing how the facts about consciousness might be logically entailed
by the physical/functional facts, in the same way that the facts about
life, or learning, or tables, can easily be seen to be the kinds of
things that could be entailed by the physical/functional facts.  Every
suggestion that I've ever seen seems hopelessly inadequate, generally
relying on some kind of implicit verificationism or eliminativism.
Perhaps you can do better.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."