🚀 go-pugleaf

In <BuDoJ5.MDM@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>In article <29sn2qc@lynx.unm.edu> amiga@phobos.unm.edu (carlos a.f  senaenterr) writes:

>>	This is the best argument for dualism that I have come across:
>>
>>1) What I can imagine is possible.
>>2) I can imagine being disembodied.
>>3) Therefore, I could be disembodied.


Of course, this argument succeeds only in demonstrating the logical 
possibilty of dualism, which many of the theory's critics accept anyway.
(There'd be little point in dicsussing - let alone defending - dualism
if it were logically impossible, but dualists argue for an *actual*
mind/brain dichotomy, not a *possible* one.)


>Personally, I don't think that any strong metaphysical conclusions
>can be drawn from the possibility of disembodiment (which is
>itself disputable).  However, there is a quite similar argument
>that I believe is a good argument for dualism, and probably
>a correct one.

>(1) It's logically possible that there could be a physical replica
>of me without any conscious states.

>(2) Therefore the existence of conscious states is a further fact,
>over and above the physical facts (i.e. it is contingent relative
>to the physical facts).

>(3) Therefore dualism is true.

>If there's anything wrong with this argument, it has to be at premise
>(1).  I confess that this premise seems obviously true to me, but
>some people would deny it.  It is contingent on those people to
>provide some kind of demonstration of how the physical facts
>could possibly logically entail the facts about consciousness,
>but such suggestions are usually manifestly unconvincing.  In
>virtue of what kind of physical properties is consciousness
>logically necessitated?  Suggestions usually revolve around
>discrimination of stimuli, or verbal reportability of mental
>states, but it seems clear that all those things are logically
>compatible with the absence of conscious experience.



Indeed the problem is at premise (1), which can be seen to assume at the        outset that which requires proof. The existence of physical 
replica sans states of consciousness is possible if, and only if,
the existence of conscious states is a "further fact". If you
reject this objection then it is contingent on you to explain how the
two may occur seperately if they are intrinsically wedded. 




Neil Horne
Dept. of Philosophy
University of Cape Town