🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <7511@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <BuDoJ5.MDM@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>>Personally, I don't think that any strong metaphysical conclusions
>>can be drawn from the possibility of disembodiment (which is
>>itself disputable).  However, there is a quite similar argument
>>that I believe is a good argument for dualism, and probably
>>a correct one.
>>
>>(1) It's logically possible that there could be a physical replica
>>of me without any conscious states.

But I don't agree with this.  I think that "bare subjective
experience" is exactly the physical existence of part of my brain.
Therefore it is NOT logically possible, etc (because the physical
duplicate would have the same conscious states).  You can only assert
that something is logically possible if you can say what it means.

>>
>>(2) Therefore the existence of conscious states is a further fact,
>>over and above the physical facts (i.e. it is contingent relative
>>to the physical facts).

But it is NOT a "further" fact (at least, you can't tell that it is);
it is a fact in a totally different domain of knowledge (from your
standpoint); you cannot tell whether they are "further" facts or not
without answering the question of identity of subject matter of the
two different domains first (i.e., you are assuming what you are
trying to prove).

>>
>>(3) Therefore dualism is true.

You haven't proven it.

>
>Is this "substance dualism" `a la Descartes, or "property dualism"
>(there are some nonreducible mental properties) or both or neither?
>
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu