🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <_cwnz1m.kmc@netcom.com> kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty) writes:
>In article <1992Sep11.224807.13323@math.ucla.edu> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
>>Dualism is simply another form of mysticism. Its the same old
>>premise: we don't understand something, therefore there must 
>>be a paranormal phenomena at work. 
>
>What mysticism? I don't know what you're railing at.  There's
>absolutely nothing paranormal going on at all.  The two
>incontrovertible facts at issue here are as plain and mundane as the
>nose on your face: there are physical phenomena such as objects, and
>there are mental phenomena such as sensations.  And a mystery: how are
>they so different?

Is this a generally agreed statement of the dualist position?  One rarely
or never sees the dualist case actually laid out clear in a positive way.
Instead, it is usually presented as objections to the reductionist
viewpoint (i.e. everything is atoms and fields, conciousness is no more
than software running on wetware).

How many types of dualists are there? At least two I think. Lets call one
"religeous" -- here there is a non-material soul and this is mystically
provided by God. I would consider this viewpoint as being outside the
realm of philosophy as it is understood here.

Let's call the other version "scientific" dualism.  I would very much like
to see this laid out with as much clarity as the reductionist position has
been; I claim that if this were attempted, it would be open to a much more
severe attack than has beeen mounted on the reductionist position.
Anyone care to try?

Dick Jackson