🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep28.151204.4333@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>By asking for an "entailment", you _assume_ a difference between the
>two sets of phenomena.  I claim that there is no reason to assume such
>a difference.  I can imagine worlds in which it would be reasonable to
>conclude that there was such a difference; but we do not live in one
>(so far as I can tell).  Being able to imagine something is not the
>same as constructing a logically possible world.  I assume that there
>is no difference between the phenomena until I see some way in which
>they behave differently (in the most general sense of "behave"; I am
>not talking "behaviourism").  This is not "fiat" unless there are
>points of difference between the events already established; but there
                                                              ^^^ ^^^^^
>are no such points of difference established; there are, of course,
 ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^ ^^^  ^^ ^^^^^^
>obvious differences in our information about the two classes of events
 ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^                              ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^

I find the assertion before the semicolon to be in flat-out
contradiction to the statement after the semicolon.  In the latter
statement you are allowing that there are two classes of events
which you admit have obvious differences.  Can we then take these
as established points of difference?  It seems to me that the
explanation of those points of difference are what is at issue here.

>but using these to conclude that the events themselves are
>different is unsound, even if you dress it up with talk about possible

In watching you argue this for days, you appear to resist admitting
that "events themselves" give rise to different phenomena because you
seem to think that's the same thing as saying the "events themselves"
are different.  But my understanding of the term "phenomenon" is that
it denotes how things appear to us, not how things are.  Now I can
remain puzzled about whether dualism is true in its catalog of the
ontological furniture of the universe, but I am utterly baffled how
anyone can maintain that there aren't at least two classes of
phenomena in the world (never mind where they come from).

You look like you are admitting that, but whenever the specific question
is put to you, you seem to deny it.  So let me draw attention to
the words that have come out of your mouth and ask you again:
how many classes of phenomena do you count?
-- 
Kevin McCarty (kmc@netcom.com)