🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <n=_ps8=.kmc@netcom.com> kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty) writes:

>DC:
>>Not so.  Nothing in my position implies that our reports of
>>consciousness don't accurately reflect the contents of our consciousness.
>
>Then I'm still misunderstanding your position.  If the functional
>organization of our brains gives rise to an "explanation" of why we
>report having qualia, but whether we actually do or not is a
>contingent further fact which might not be the case in some alternate
>universe, then the fact that we actually do have qualia is logically
>independent of what we are bound to say.  In other words, our reports
>of consciousness might not accurately reflect the contents of our
>consciousness (even though I think in this case they do).  Perhaps I
>have a faulty notion of what "logical independence" means.
>Or perhaps logical independence is irrelevant to principle (2), and
>you're simply stating what you believe to be an empirical fact.

The latter is closest to the mark.  Principle (2) says that, in fact,
our reports of conscious states do accurately reflect those mental
states.  That's compatible with logical independence.  It asserts
simply that there's an empirical connection there.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."