🚀 go-pugleaf

REPLY TO ABUSE OF DETERMINISM 1:

SUMMARY: The first wave of postings following my original <spurrett.23.
720960465@superbowl.und.ac.za> all included some criticism/abuse of my 
argument form.  This posting attempts to clarify and respond.

In article <9211051152.AAsmaug10219@smaug.uio.no> solan@math.uio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
>The legal systems are based on beliefs about the world,
>and cannot therefore itself justify the world as being
>as was believed, merely on the ground that it was believed.

In article <?> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>The legal system is designed by people with the intention that it will
>affect the behavior of people.  You cannot use it to draw conclusions
>about inanimate objects.  The legal system is an expression of our
>culture, so cannot easily be applied to questions such as the validity
>of determinism.

  I will begin by pointing out that the form of my argument was intended to 
be _transcendental_.  This is not to say that I meditated, or shaved my head 
and walked around in an orange sheet playing the tambourine while formulating 
it.  I use the word in a well understood technical sense made current by 
Kant.  For those not in the know, a transcendetal argument in one which 
(roughly) argues from the properties of some thing/property etc. known to 
exist/be experienced etc. to a conclusion about the nature of the world.  
The essential assumption behind any transcedental argument can be stated as 
`however the world is, it _cannot_ be in some way such that thing/property 
etc which we started from is impossible.'  For example any argument which 
had the conclusion that there was no such thing as consciousness, _whatever_ 
else its merits, (consistency, agreement with religious dogma, etc) could be 
shown to be false on the basis of elementary transcendental reasoning.  (In 
the case of this explanatory example common sense should be enough.)

  That point made, for now, in what way was my argument transcendetal?  The 
initial datum from which I attempted to reason was the experience of 
choosing, and the distinction we (as far as I can tell universally) 
acknowledge between `do-ers' and `do-ees', particularly as manifest in 
legal systems and procedures.  The analysis which followed attempted to show 
that belief in this distinction involves disbelief in determinism with 
respect to do-ers.  If the analysis is correct (and it has not been 
criticised in this thread yet) then the only avenue for attack is the 
interpretation of the datum.

  In this regard Cosma Shalizi has a very low opinion of my position on 
precisely that issue:

In article <> lizi@soda.berkeley.edu (Cosma Shalizi) writes:
>2. I'm not sure the reasoning is any better than the following argument
>   (circa 500 B.C.): "All known religions, regardless of their differences
>   on Who Is In Charge, What They Like and Whom To Kill, agree in teaching
>   that the Earth is flat. Even the philosophers have agreed to this,
>   which after all is nothing more than what is obvious to perception.
>   Thus, to refute these new round-Earth scoffers, nothing more is 
>   required than that our religion and philosophy be based on truth."
>   Short form: What reason - what _shred_ of a reason - do we have for
>   thinking our legal systems are based on truth on this issue?

  Before any details it is _not_ a fact that all religions (even circa 
500 B.C.) regarded the earth as flat.  There were many cosmologies with 
wildly differing views, including various heliocentrisms, and the one-time 
Pythagorean view that the earth was a cylinder, with us on the one flat end 
and some other folks on the other, with the whole contraption moving around 
the sun.  It is also not `obvious to perception' since ancient persons had 
used simple mathematics to calculate the curvature of the earth (although 
_not_ following this through to regarding the earth as fully spherical in 
most cases.)

  What I think is essentiall different about the datum of the satire above 
and my premiss is that the `do-er'/`do-ee' distinction (the DoDoDi) seems 
intellectually indespensible.  I firmly believe that the earth is an oblate 
spheroid (more or less).  _BUT_ I can quite clearly imagine what it would be 
like to be me on a flat earth, or a cube, or inside a hollow earth, or any 
other shape you care to name.  In some I would want to have more velcro on 
my footwear, but in none would I think (except for practical reasons) that 
my existence would be in principle impossible.

  With the DoDoDi it is different.  When I am feeling offensively 
mechanistic I can just about manage to think of almost everybody (including 
family members) as being do-ees.  Almost everyone, that is, except for 
myself.  With myself it is, as far as I can tell, a _theoretical_ 
impossibilty in the same way as doubting `I exist' was for Descartes.  I 
cannot entertain the negation of the DoDoDi without also having to think of 
the attendant impossibility of the conscious agency which enables me to 
think of the possibility at all.

  The question, therefore, is:  `Is there some argument capable of 
dispensing with the DoDoDi without also rendering the conscious agency which 
I feel myself to have impossible?'  [Or which gives me some _convincing_ 
redescription of it which enables me to understand myself in another way.]

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o