🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <C0CuM3.sv@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:

>In article <1993Jan3.194211.18969@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <C0Apzo.IDG@ccu.umanitoba.ca> 
>>feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:

MF:
>>>1) That every case of (A&B) is also a case of (A) does not establish
>>>that there is no distinction betwen (A&B) and (A);

MZ:
>>Soit.  Was anyone stupid enough to claim otherwise?

MF:
>Well, yeah, sort of; or at least, accidentally committed himself to
>some such; but the villain escapes just deserts, because the line to
>which I was replying seems to have gone missing, and I don't keep a
>file of old discussions.  So one of us is dead lucky, boy oh boy.

The most you can accuse me of, is having said something that lends
itself to misinterpretation when taken out of context.  I think the
same is true of all human discourse.

MZ:
>>are you really suggesting that the fact
>>of expressing one's attitude, is not _ipso facto_ an occasion of
>>reporting one's dispositional property to behave in a certain fashion,

MF:
>Oh, yes; certainly; of course: the whole point of doing a taxonomy of
>speech acts is to win the freedom to distinguish EXPRESSING from
>REPORTING.  Whether or not emotivism is true (and, of course, you and
>I know it to be false), it does not dissolve into egoism; expressing
>distaste does not equate to correctly reporting distaste -- else,
>logical positivists would never have hoped to simultaneously espouse
>value noncognitivism and emotivism.  And as to setting snares under my own
>feet, your admirer proposes a "what? you offer vulgar behaviourism?" metaphor.

Surely the correct question is whether logical positivists *could*
ever have hoped to simultaneously espouse value noncognitivism and
emotivism.  Surely you can figure out my answer to the question on the
basis of what I have said.

MZ:
>>or a factual property of having a certain type of belief?

MF:
>Don't know what you mean here.  That one may validly infer from the
>expression of distaste to the presence of some belief about inherent
>value?  Depends on context, as we pragmatists say.  Babies express
>dis-taste for green olives, but their beliefs are probably restricted
>to theorems about squares on triangles.

Wasn't that Norman Malcolm who attributed a belief that a squirrel was
up in *that* (factually wrong) tree, to his befuddled dog?

>-- 
>Michael Feld                  | E-mail: <feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
>Dept. of Philosophy           | FAX: (204) 261-0021
>University of Manitoba        | Voice: (204) 474-9136
>Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada


cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Les beaulx bastisseurs nouveaulx de pierres mortes ne sont escriptz
en mon livre de vie.  Je ne bastis que pierres vives: ce sont hommes."