🚀 go-pugleaf

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In article <schiller.726827765@hpas5>, schiller@prl.philips.nl (schiller c) writes:
>> I also subscribe to the idea that every theoretical term (such as
>> 'alpha particle', 'mass', 'charge', etc.) is simply *shorthand* for
>> observations. This is the way physics and the other sciences have grown
>> and have been developed. 
>>
>> Btw, "mass of an object"  means "difficulty to move it",

In article <C0qw25.134@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
> Or perhaps it means "difficulty to stop it from moving".  Or perhaps it
> means "difficulty in changing its direction".  What it *means* is a feature
> of the *laws* in which 'mass' appears -- laws in which 'force', 'energy',
> 'charge', etc. also appear.

This objection does not damage the terminology-as-shorthand
thesis.  Suppose that "mass" initially means any or all of these
things.  Gary Merrill can complain that this reflects a theory of
identity, but Schiller can respond that it merely reflects a
failure to disambiguate because observation has not required it.
The term "mass" then runs the risk of being ambiguous, but so do
most terms.  At the point when it is needed (if ever), physicists
can refine their terminology and speak of "stopping mass,"
"starting mass," and "turning mass." (Physicists already
distinguish inertial mass from gravitational mass, and Gary
Merrill may rightly point out that this is because our theories
embed the isotropy of the universe with respect to physical law
at a more basic level than the equivalence of gravitational force
and acceleration.  This strikes me as a good example that *some*
distinctions are theory laden.)

It is undoubtedly the case that words that refer to observations
are potentially ambiguous, even such simple terms as "cat" or
"rug." (Thank you, Wittgenstein.)  It strikes me as quite a leap
from there to the notion that such terms are theory laden in any
significant sense.  When ambiguities arise, they are easily
resolved by introducing new terms that express finer
distinctions. 

> ...  I wonder this:  Are you in fact familiar with the vast 
> literature in this area while you choose to reject the well
> known criticisms and counterexamples to your views for some
> rational reason?  Or are you ignorant of this literature and
> simply clinging to your own view based on your "intuition" of 
> how things are?

Perhaps Schiller is waiting for someone who is "familiar with the
vast literature" to give a good and interesting criticism before
he delves into it.  After all, a "vast literature" has little to
recommend it if those who read it, study it, and recommend it are
not made the wiser thereby.  (Consider: are you led to reading
Rand's essays from the babblings of Objectivists?)

Russell