🚀 go-pugleaf

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In article <1993Jan12.152736.16617@samba.oit.unc.edu> Charlie.Creegan@launchpad.unc.edu (Charlie Creegan) writes:
> CF Wittgenstein on the difficulties inherent in ostensive 
> definition; you have to know what kind of thing is being
> pointed at before you can know what is being pointed at.
> Thus a conceptual scheme logically precedes a particular
> usage. ...

Logically, yes, but not always temporally.  When the islander
points and says "floop," he could be giving the word for
"finger," or "points," or that to which he points, or several
other things.  So the stranded sailor makes a guess at a
conceptual scheme.  If the guess is right, further dependent
communication becomes possible; if it is wrong, the two remain
confused by later interactions and try yet again.  Undoubtedly,
the ability to guess at and try conceptual schemas is part of
what we are able to do and part of what is required to learn
language.  It may even be that there is some innate preference to
some conceptual schemas over others.  But sometimes the knowledge
that we have guessed the right one comes after its use. 

> ... Wittgenstein probably rolls in his grave at having this
> called or assimilated to "theory" ...

I'm still choking on that one.

Russell