🚀 go-pugleaf

Svein:
>>Hope you're not the Jamie that Aerosmith sing[?] about.

Jamie:
>I wouldn't know. Presumably, I am, relative to SOME interpretation....

This is precisely what I find so bizarre about your position. 
I don't want to argue about it, really, since I don't know much about
this whole area.  But I would like some more information.

What is a proposition, as distinct from a sentence?  I've always
(well, not always, only for the past few years since I heard about
such things!) thought of propositions as equivalence classes for
sentences.  But I'm not sure how this fits into your interpretational
scheme.

Do propositions need interpretation?  Or is interpretation the scheme
that transforms a sentence into a proposition?

Did you say that mental states need interpretation?  It seems more
plausible to say that (at least some!) mental states (or processes)
ARE interpretation.

Anyhow, anything you can say to shed light here would be appreciated.

I'm not above reading a book, if you want to suggest one.  After all,
Christmas vacation IS coming up and Randall hasn't come through with
his promised suggested reading on QM.  (Nudge, nudge.)

I wish Mikhail Zeleny would attack me.

--Jimbo

In article <1gib6mINN76i@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>From: solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
>
>|> Anyway. I think what Randall showed is not that a sentence in itself
>|> is true, you're right. IF "a sentence in itself" is understood to
>|> mean an UNINTERPRETED sentence. But what does seem correct is that
>|> a sentence can be thought of as interpreted in a context in which
>|> there is no one to interpret it. THAT is what Randall showed.
>
>>No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
>>non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
>>cases rather arbitrary, though.)
>
>Huh?
>I have no idea why you think he showed that.

Neither do I.  I'm on Jamie's side of this argument; truth (of
sentences in a certain language) is not defined in terms of observers
or interpreters.  Take my argument and apply it, further, to the truth
or falsehood of a sentence which has never in fact been uttered by
anyone (it would be self-defeating for me to give a counterexample,
but counting arguments show that there are such).  I don't agree with
Jamie on "types and tokens" (sentences are not equivalence classes of
tokens), precisely because the canons which determine truth or
falsehood of a sentence could in fact be applied to the so far
unuttered sentence which has no "tokens" at all; I think of sentences
as abstract objects of the same order as numbers.  By the way, there
is nothing arbitrary about the assignment of truth value to the kind
of sentence in my example; it is simply that we are not in a position
to find out what the correct assignment is.

[...]

>
>Jamie





-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

>Posted on 14 Dec 1992 at 13:41:47 by jimmy donal wales

>>>Hope you're not the Jamie that Aerosmith sing[?] about.
>
>Jamie:
>>I wouldn't know. Presumably, I am, relative to SOME interpretation....
>
>This is precisely what I find so bizarre about your position.

I don't see why it's bizarre. It seems obviously true, to me.

>What is a proposition, as distinct from a sentence?  I've always
>(well, not always, only for the past few years since I heard about
>such things!) thought of propositions as equivalence classes for
>sentences.  But I'm not sure how this fits into your interpretational
>scheme.

It's ok to think of propositions as equivalence classes of sentences.
Well, by and large it is (not for sentences that contain indexicals).
But then you'd BETTER be taking INTERPRETED sentences, otherwise
the conception of propositions makes no sense.

Propositions are what sentences express. I can say what a French person
says even though I don't speak French. That "what" is a proposition.
I can also believe a proposition, etc.
Propositions are contents of sentences.

>Do propositions need interpretation?  Or is interpretation the scheme
>that transforms a sentence into a proposition?

The latter.
An interpretation of a sentence tells you what proposition it expresses.
(Roughly--it might tell you something slightly different, e.g. if the
sentence contains an indexical.)

>Did you say that mental states need interpretation?  It seems more
>plausible to say that (at least some!) mental states (or processes)
>ARE interpretation.

Mental states have contents. So do sentences. What content a sentence
has is a matter of its interpretation. What content a mental state
has is a matter of its interpretation.

Suppose you believe that mental states are brain states (or at least
that a token of a mental state is a token of a brain state, to allow
someone like Donald Davidson to agree). A brain state is not a proposition.
But it may have a propositional content.

>I'm not above reading a book, if you want to suggest one.  After all,
>Christmas vacation IS coming up and Randall hasn't come through with
>his promised suggested reading on QM.  (Nudge, nudge.)

Yike.
I can't think of a good one on the relevant topic.
Sorry.

>I wish Mikhail Zeleny would attack me.

I look forward to it.

Jamie

>Posted on 14 Dec 1992 at 15:14:53 by Randall Holmes

>>>No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
>>>non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
>>>cases rather arbitrary, though.)
>>
>>Huh?
>>I have no idea why you think he showed that.
>
>Neither do I.

Oh, good.

> I'm on Jamie's side of this argument; truth (of
>sentences in a certain language) is not defined in terms of observers
>or interpreters.  Take my argument and apply it, further, to the truth
>or falsehood of a sentence which has never in fact been uttered by
>anyone (it would be self-defeating for me to give a counterexample,
>but counting arguments show that there are such).

Of course, we can DESCRIBE a sentence which has never been uttered, and
it STILL will never have been uttered. So you CAN give a counterexample.

I'll take a shot!

Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
list of 100-word sentences of English.

(A small prize to whoever can utter it first.)

It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
one of us, no one ever will.

> I don't agree with
>Jamie on "types and tokens" (sentences are not equivalence classes of
>tokens), precisely because the canons which determine truth or
>falsehood of a sentence could in fact be applied to the so far
>unuttered sentence which has no "tokens" at all; I think of sentences
>as abstract objects of the same order as numbers.

I'm not sure what the disagreement is supposed to be. I think I agree
with the above.
I allowed that Jimbo could think of *propositions* as equivalence
classes of sentences, for most purposes. I was then thinking of
sentences as abstract objects. I usually think of types as
abstract objects.

Jamie

In article <1gius4INNo68@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie) writes:
>>Posted on 14 Dec 1992 at 15:14:53 by Randall Holmes
>
>>>>No, Randall showed that a conviction\belief can be true even if
>>>>non-checkable. (It does make asignment of truth value in those
>>>>cases rather arbitrary, though.)
>>>
>>>Huh?
>>>I have no idea why you think he showed that.
>>
>>Neither do I.
>
>Oh, good.
>
>> I'm on Jamie's side of this argument; truth (of
>>sentences in a certain language) is not defined in terms of observers
>>or interpreters.  Take my argument and apply it, further, to the truth
>>or falsehood of a sentence which has never in fact been uttered by
>>anyone (it would be self-defeating for me to give a counterexample,
>>but counting arguments show that there are such).
>
>Of course, we can DESCRIBE a sentence which has never been uttered, and
>it STILL will never have been uttered. So you CAN give a counterexample.
>
>I'll take a shot!
>
>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>
>(A small prize to whoever can utter it first.)
>
>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>one of us, no one ever will.
>
>> I don't agree with
>>Jamie on "types and tokens" (sentences are not equivalence classes of
>>tokens), precisely because the canons which determine truth or
>>falsehood of a sentence could in fact be applied to the so far
>>unuttered sentence which has no "tokens" at all; I think of sentences
>>as abstract objects of the same order as numbers.
>
>I'm not sure what the disagreement is supposed to be. I think I agree
>with the above.
>I allowed that Jimbo could think of *propositions* as equivalence
>classes of sentences, for most purposes. I was then thinking of
>sentences as abstract objects. I usually think of types as
>abstract objects.

Then we don't disagree; I'm willing to talk about concrete instances
of sentences being "tokens" of abstract sentences (used as "types") as
long as it is understood that sentences which have no tokens are
distinct from one another ("types" are not mere equivalence classes).


>
>Jamie


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

In article <1gius4INNo68@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu,
(Jamie) writes, among other things:

>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>
>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>one of us, no one ever will.

Not only do you not define truth with respect to sentences of English, your
example is circular.  The sentence is or isn't syntactically correct and may
or may not have semantic content.  By saying that the sentence is on a list
of English sentences, you imply that it is syntactically correct.  The
semantic content of the sentence, however, still depends on it being
interpreted.

+------------------->  Signature Block : Version 3.C  <---------------------+
|                                                                           |
|    "Nothing astonishes men so much as common-sense and plain dealing."    |
|                                            --- Ralph Waldo Emerson        |
|                                                                           |
+---------------->   Copyright (c) 1992 by Doc O'Leary   <------------------+

>Posted on 20 Dec 1992 at 18:54:07 by oleary@staff.tc.umn.edu

J:
>>Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>>list of 100-word sentences of English.
>>
>>It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>>ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>>one of us, no one ever will.

Response from O'Leary:

>Not only do you not define truth with respect to sentences of English, your
>example is circular.  The sentence is or isn't syntactically correct and may
>or may not have semantic content.  By saying that the sentence is on a list
>of English sentences, you imply that it is syntactically correct.  The
>semantic content of the sentence, however, still depends on it being
>interpreted.

Of COURSE I didn't define truth with respect to sentences of English.
Would you like me to do so? What sorts of criteria must I meet? If
O'Leary insists, I will do my best to define truth for English, but
I'm not promising anything.

The rest of the objection is very close to jibberish.
By saying that the sentence is on a list of English sentences I
OBVIOUSLY imply that it is syntactically correct. Does O'Leary
deny that the syntactically correct sentences of English are
enumerable? They are obviously enumerable by an alphabetic list.
Does he deny that there are ANY 100-word sentences of English?
Or that the set of 100-word sentences of English is enumerated
by alphabetization? Or that the list has a first entry?

The semantic content of a sentence depends on its being interpreted
in one sense. This is precisely the point I have been making.
If we regard English sentences as intepreted, then they have a truth
value. Whether they have truth value is independent of whether anyone
has ever actually interpreted them, or whether anyone ever will
interpret them. THAT was the point Randall was making. He worried
that he could not give an example of a sentence that no one has
ever interpreted or ever will. So I gave an example, not by
constructing it but by describing a definite English sentence.


The complaint that my example is "circular" is ridiculous. No circularity
has been pointed to.

Jamie

Somewhere along the "Truth" thread, Jamie writes:


" Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
  list of 100-word sentences of English.

  It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
  ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
  one of us, no one ever will. "

That something's amiss becomes clear when you consider that in the event of your
sentence being an imperative (the requirement of alphabetic order may yield
something like "Abandon aardvarks!" at the top of your list) or a question
the sentence is neither true nor false. 

In fact, it is widely held that propositions, as opposed to sentences, are the
bearers of truth value. The process of interpretaion involves nothing less
than establishing a correspondence between sentences and statements (which
also have no truth value) and if possible (and this is not possible in the 
cases mentioned above) between statements and propositions. 
Consider also what truth value you would care to assign to ambiguous sentences. 


(I don't know how helpful this is, I've missed much of the thread.)

Neil Horne
Cape Town

In article <Bztz5L.DMM@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>, nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E
Horne) said:

>Somewhere along the "Truth" thread, Jamie writes:
>
>
>" Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
>  list of 100-word sentences of English.
>
>  It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
>  ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
>  one of us, no one ever will. "
>
>That something's amiss becomes clear when you consider that in the event of
your
>sentence being an imperative (the requirement of alphabetic order may yield
>something like "Abandon aardvarks!" at the top of your list) or a question
>the sentence is neither true nor false.

Quite so. I should have said, "indicative sentences."

>In fact, it is widely held that propositions, as opposed to sentences, are the
>bearers of truth value.

In fact, it is not.
In fact, it is widely held that propositions, *in addition to sentences*,
are the bearers of truth values.

Many people, including theorists, do not like propositions at all.
I do. But in the spirit of my ontological liberalism, I try to
make as many accomodations for the propositional skeptics as I can.
This liberalism stood me well in a brief conversation (resulting
from one of my postings to this news group) with a Wittgensteinian,
about propositions unexpressable in English.

Even so, I take your point, approximately.

>The process of interpretaion involves nothing less
>than establishing a correspondence between sentences and statements (which
>also have no truth value) and if possible (and this is not possible in the
>cases mentioned above) between statements and propositions.

Again, I agree with the spirit.
I would not call interpretation a "process." There need be no literal
process of interpretation in order for a sentence to be interpreted.
An interpretation (thought of as a mathematical function) once
stipulated, no one actually has to apply it. Thus, we may think
of the alphabetically first 100-word INDICATIVE (nb my concession)
sentence of English as interpreted, and as being true or false,
even though there has never been any intepretive process for it.

>Consider also what truth value you would care to assign to ambiguous
sentences.

Again, I take the point.

I am inclined to think of ambiguous sentences along the lines of
indexical sentences. Is that sufficient?

Jamie

>Neil Horne
>Cape Town